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The determination of urban resilience and community response to flooding are significant 
aspects of hazard management and disaster risk reduction.  Anticipating hazard impacts is vital 
to the development of flood mitigation strategies and emergency response planning. Argentina is 
an emerging economy with high flood hazard exposure, and its capital, Buenos Aires, is one of 
the most affected areas. Inappropriate disaster response could therefore affect food supply 
chains, telecommunications and transport systems nationwide.  Flood risk areas in Buenos Aires 
City have been geographically identified.  However, flood impacts have not been well 
considered, and the emergency response capacity of the city has not been evaluated.  This 
research examined flood impacts in Buenos Aires on infrastructure lifelines and critical facilities, 
as well as on the wider commercial and residential built environment under current conditions, 
and accounting for projected impacts of climate change. Evacuation dynamics were explored 
through characterising spatiotemporal population exposure, modelling evacuation routes, and 
analysing emergency service response areas. Analyses of different sea-level rise and storm return 
interval scenarios showed clear trends in increasing impacts under increasing hazard intensities; 
these impacts were ameliorated when flood warnings were applied. Spatiotemporal population 
exposures developed for evacuation analyses showed increasing impacts under increasing sea-
level rise scenarios. Dynamic evacuation analyses highlighted inadequacies in current welfare 
facilities to shelter evacuees, however modelling suggests that shelter and emergency response 
can both be improved by increasing the number of facilities. This research contributes to the 
quantification of impacts on the built environment and associated economic losses, and helps 
inform disaster response and management. The methodological approach presented here 
provides an analytical framework for flood impact analyses  and evacuation dynamics that can 
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Defining Flood Hazards  
 
Context of Study  
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has analysed the causes and 
consequences of climate change and sea level rise (Church et al., 2013), and adaptation measures 
for urban environments (Revi et al., 2014) have been published in accordance with IPCC 
projections.  In addition, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (United 
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction [UNISDR], 2015) has established targets, such as a 
substantial reduction in the number of affected people, economic losses and damage to critical 
infrastructure caused by disasters, both natural and manmade, including climate change, sea level 
rises and floods (UNISDR, 2015). 
 Given the relevance of IPCC projections and the Sendai Framework to Argentina, the 
Argentinian government and scholars have devoted efforts to better understand and manage risk.  
Argentina is among ten emerging economies with the highest flood hazard exposure (World 
Bank, 2016), and its capital, Buenos Aires (BA), is one of the most affected areas.  The city 
provides a good example of a developing city highly vulnerable to floods.  Between 1984 and 
2004, the city suffered 37 flood events (World Bank, 2005), equating to more than one event per 
year and millions of dollars in damage, as in 2013, when the city suffered a USD 300 million 
loss (World Bank, 2016).  Changes in wind direction, more frequent storm events and sea level 
rises have led to flood risks becoming more significant (Lecertua, 2010). 
 Given that BA is the national capital, an inappropriate disaster response and recovery 





national and international transport system.  Because it is the main business, financial, cultural 
and political centre of Argentina, the city contributes 24% of the nation’s gross domestic product 
(World Bank, 2016).  
 The fact that a large coastal area of the BA’s La Plata River is within 5 m of mean sea 
level (Re & Menéndez, 2005) (Figure 1) and the city is the largest populated area in the country, 
with approximately 3 million inhabitants (Argentina's National Institute of Statistics and 
Censuses [INDEC], 2010), many people can be affected by floods.  Flood impacts affect not only 
city inhabitants, but also 2 million daily commuters from suburban areas and other provinces 







Figure 1.  Buenos Aires elevation map and waterways. 
Note.  Map created by the author with raw data obtained from https://data.buenosaires.gob.ar/dataset (GCABA, 
n.d.).  
 
 It is also important to take into account that the effects of flood events go beyond their 
immediate impact.  For instance, power outages can last from a couple of hours up to several 
days, as experienced in April 2013, when several neighbourhoods were without power for 15 
hours or more (World Bank, 2016).  In BA, subsidies or tax exemptions are offered to the 





took place in April 2012 and April 2013 resulted in a USD 49 million budget impact on the city 
(World Bank, 2016).  Furthermore, clean-up, restoration and reconstruction processes can also 
take a long period, depending on the resilience levels of each family, and the regional economic 
context.  
 Flood causes are well understood by the city authorities and scholars (Lecertua, 2010; 
World Bank, 2016).  Flood risk areas in BA have already been geographically delineated 
(Lecertua, 2010; Re & Menéndez, 2005) by modelling software.  They have also been 
investigated from socioeconomic (Costa, 1988; Natenzon et al., 2003) and political (González, 
2005) perspectives by analysing average income levels and the government’s flood management 
strategies in risk areas.  However, the relationships between flood risk, vulnerability, potential 
damage and the city’s response capacity have not yet been deeply analysed.  The potential 
damage to buildings and their contents has not been quantified as a function of their use 
(residential, commercial or industrial), which will be done in this research.  Furthermore, no 
evacuation models or assessments of emergency facilities’ service areas have been developed 
yet.  Therefore, evacuation scenarios and service areas will be evaluated in order to increase the 
knowledge in this field and potentially improve flood risk management and response capacity in 
BA.  
 
Literature Review  
 The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (UNISDR, 2015) set up 
an outline to better understand disaster risk, and to enhance risk management.  In particular, risk 
can be assessed in terms of hazard, exposure and vulnerability (Figure 2).  Hazard is understood 





persons and assets that can be affected by hazards, while vulnerability is determined by the 
factors or processes that influence susceptibility to the impacts of hazards (UNISDR, 2017).  
These three concepts define risk in terms of potential losses (deaths, injuries and damage to 
property) in a system or society.  In this thesis, all these concepts are used to structure the 
literature review of flood risk.  
 
Figure 2.  Disaster risk terminology. Risk can be assessed in terms of hazard, exposure and vulnerability (United 
Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response [UN-SPIDER], 
n.d).  
 
Floods in Buenos Aires 
 Floods in BA have two main natural causes: high-intensity rainfall and high tides 
affecting the La Plata River, usually exacerbated by strong southerly winds (known as 
“Sudestadas”), which make drainage of the river into the sea more difficult.  Southerly winds 





the low gradient of the BA plains as they slope towards the La Plata River does not facilitate 
water drainage (Clichevsky & Herzer, 2000). 
 Climate variability has worsened the issue in several ways.  For example, Escobar et al. 
(2003) found that the South Atlantic anticyclone has increased its intensity and has altered its 
route towards the south since the 1970s, especially during summer.  Consequently, the intensity 
of the winds that go through the La Plata River estuary has also increased and shifted towards the 
east.  In addition, Castañeda & Barros (1994) reported that average annual rainfall has increased 
since the 1950s.  The frequency of high-intensity rainfall has increased as well (Lecertua, 2010).  
These variations partially explain the rise in the median water level of the La Plata River, which 
has been approximately 17 cm in the 20th Century (D’Onofrio et al., 2003).  
 The El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO), a global climate cycle that disrupts regular 
patterns of wind and rainfall, influences the behaviour of the La Plata River.  However, no big 
changes have been observed in monthly mean hourly water levels (0.10 m), or in monthly 
maximum high waters recorded in BA (D’Onofrio, Fiore, & Romero, 1999).  In this regard, it is 
important to consider that climate change can alter the behaviour of the ENSO, and that its 
intensity has increased during the last three decades (UN, 2009).  Climate change also 
contributes to sea level rises (IPCC, 2013), and increases in temperature and precipitation, as 
reported in the Third National Communication on Climate Change (Sea and Atmospheric 
Research Centre [CIMA], 2016), and as plotted on climate change risk maps for Argentina (The 
Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, Argentina [MAyDS], n.d.). 
 In addition to these processes, anthropogenic factors affect flood risk (Figure 3).  For 
instance, the shift of drinking water sources from groundwater to the La Plata River, and reduced 





rise in groundwater levels has triggered occasional inundation of basements and underground 
garages, failure of sanitation systems and sewage overflows (Foster & Garduño, 2002).  
 
 
Figure 3. Flood risk components and influencing factors. 
 
 The urbanisation of BA has caused removal of wetlands, channelisation of waterways 
and an increase in impervious surfaces and runoff (Sejenovich & Cock Mendoza, 2000).  
Changes such as paving and the construction of railways and streets at right angles to the natural 
drainage flow have also undermined the capacity of the city to deal with flooding.  Furthermore, 
landfill and urban development in BA have transformed the hydromorphology of the city, by 
altering natural stream channels, and their discharge to the La Plata River and the coastline.  
 Population growth and a lack of urban planning have also increased exposure to floods, 
because more settlements have been established in low-lying areas, such as the Matanza–





have been motivated not only by the tight real estate market, but also by the BA city council, 
with monetary credits being offered on building, and housing support programmes such as Pro-
Tierra, Pro-Casa and Pro-Lote (Clichevsky & Herzer, 2000).  The city is also regulated by a 
flexible building code, with lack of control and enforcement manifest.  Therefore, the exposure 
of the population and their assets to flooding has grown.  All these issues have arisen not only in 
the city, but also in the suburbs, where dwellings have increased significantly in former wetlands 
of the Paraná Delta, which used to act as a buffer zone.  Furthermore, deficient maintenance of 
the drainage system has meant the system cannot cope with changes to the city’s infiltration 
capacity, the maximum rate at which the soil can absorb water (Sejenovich & Cock Mendoza, 
2000; World Bank, 2016). The rainwater that cannot infiltrate into the ground due to impervious 
areas causes more surface runoff, which must be collected by drainage systems.  
 These issues are a direct consequence of city authorities’ past tendency to accept floods 
as natural events that could not be mitigated or planned for (González, 2005; Koutsovitis & 
Goyeneche, n.d.; Sejenovich & Cock Mendoza, 2000).  Throughout the years, environmental 
awareness and social concern about frequent flooding have increased, as well as public 
knowledge about structural and non-structural measures available for flood mitigation.  These 
changes in perception have led to a slight improvement in flood prevention, mitigation and 
response measures.  However, factors such as the city council’s limited budget and the urgency 
to solve issues that are “more important” have delayed the implementation of flood mitigation 
strategies.  Therefore, a rigidity trap in terms of ideological and economic factors has led to an 






Flood Modelling in Buenos Aires 
 Lecertua (2010) has developed a flood model for BA (Figure 4) to demarcate hazard 
zones in past and predicted flood scenarios for the years 1990, 2030 and 2070.  The Lecertua 
(2010) model was based on the Re & Menéndez (2005) Río de la Plata two-dimensional (RPP-
2D) hydrodynamic model of the La Plata River, which uses Navier–Stokes equations for shallow 
waters.  Data from 1990–1999, collected at the BA water level station, were used to establish a 
baseline.  Future scenarios for the years 2030 and 2070 have been based on the IPCC’s A2 
storylines for a future world, where no big socioeconomic changes are expected, the global 
population keeps growing, economic development is focused at the regional level and 
technological changes are slow to occur (IPCC, 2001a, 2001b; Lecertua, 2010).  The IPCC 
projections for sea level rise, 19 cm and 50 cm for the 2030 and 2070 decades, respectively 
(IPCC, 2001a, 2001b), were incorporated into the Lecertua (2010) flood model.  
 The Lecertua (2010) BA flood model was based on the mean level of the La Plata River 
(0.80 m), as measured by the Naval Hydrographic Service during the 1990s, and a flood 
threshold (1.60 m), which corresponds to the maximum astronomical tide.  Flow increases in La 
Plata River tributaries were not simulated in future flood scenarios because increases in flow of 
up to 30% do not have a significant effect on river flood levels in BA (Re & Menéndez, 2005).  
Wind patterns and future wind changes were analysed, however, because winds do play a large 
role in local flooding behaviour. 
 Lecertua (2010) obtained the bathymetry data of his model from digitised depths of the 
La Plata River (Administrative Comission of the La Plata River [CARP], 1989), databases and 
two naval charts (H-113 and H-116) provided by the Naval Hydrographic Service.  The rugosity 





shallow, but not on the external section closer to the seafront.  Thus, a uniform 0.015 Manning 
coefficient was used (Lecertua, 2010) in the model.  The Lecertua (2010) model also used the 
parallels 35.8°S and 40.5°S, and the meridian 51.5°W, as mathematical oceanic borders, and the 
Argentinian and Uruguayan coasts as physical boundaries.  Low-energy waves were assigned as 
the eastern border because their energy is smaller compared to energy contained by waves 
propagated along the continental platform (Re & Menéndez, 2005).  The northern border was 
assumed to be non-reflective.  Astronomical tides were reckoned for the southern border 
(Lecertua, 2010). 
 The results of Lecertua’s (2010) hydrodynamic model were plotted on flood risk maps 
showing the height and duration of predicted floods for different recurrence intervals (2, 5 and 10 
years).  The digital terrain model (DTM) grid, used for creating inundation risk maps, consisted 
of 250 m-resolution cells.  The maps were referenced to the Military Geographical Institute 
(IGM) datum.  In addition, the local city council identified flood vulnerable areas based on 
historical data describing areas inundated during past high-intensity rainfall events (Government 






Figure 4.  Areas in BA that are exposed to flooding by the La Plata River, or waterlogged by high-intensity rainfall, 
identified by a river flood model and the local council. 
Note. Map created by the author with raw data obtained from https://data.buenosaires.gob.ar/dataset (GCABA, n.d). 
River flood model adapted from Lecertua (2010) with permission. 
 
Flood Impact Assessment 
 Flood exposure comprises the social and built environment that can be affected by floods, 
which can change through time, for example, due to urbanisation or population growth.  Herein, 
a review of various methods to quantify flood impacts on exposed assets is presented.  However, 





instance, disaster impacts in Argentina are usually recorded in DesInventar (UNISDR, n.d.), a 
Latin American database that collects information from the media, domestic databases and 
government organisations.  Despite multiple sources, DesInventar is missing many records, and 
records include data collected up to the year 2009 only.  
 
 Damage to infrastructure lifelines and utilities.  Impacts on utilities vary depending on 
flood parameters such as depth, velocity, duration, and sediment transport.  Impacts also depend 
on the vertical location of electrical and mechanical equipment.  Damage extent also depends on 
the timing and nature of management interventions, such as shutting down facilities.  In addition, 
flood vulnerability is not the same for all components of all systems.  For example, fresh water 
and wastewater systems are usually capable of resisting floods, so no severe damage is expected 
(Penning-Rowsell et al., 2005); however, pumping stations of the water-supply network are 
highly vulnerable (Reese & Ramsay, 2010).  Floods usually cause interruptions to electrical and 
telecommunications services, however.  Power outages in BA can last from a couple of hours up 
to several days.  
 
 Transport disruption.  Damage to roads and traffic disruption affect transport networks 
and accessibility.  According to Penning-Rowsell et al. (2005), flood impacts on transportation 
need to be evaluated carefully, especially when low-return-period floods disrupt a large portion 
of the road network. Return period is understood as the estimated time interval between events of 
a similar size or intensity (NIWA, n.d.).  Reese and Ramsay (2010) maintained that impacts to 
the road network, such as inundation, erosion, scouring of road beds and shoulders, accumulation 





comparison with damage to buildings and their contents.  However, flow velocity and wave 
action do cause damage to roads.  These are critical factors in flash flood areas, but not in 
floodplain areas common to BA.  In floodplain areas, the damage to road infrastructure usually 
represents less than 1% of total direct, tangible damage (Messner et al., 2006).  The clean-up 
costs of the affected road network can be based on data from Reese’s 2003 study (as cited in 
Reese & Ramsay, 2010), which assumes a cost of USD 8.70 per m2 of flooded road.  
 Impacts on the rail system are infrequent, except for cases of extreme weather, as 
described by Messner et al. (2006).  For instance, on April 15th, 1940 in BA, the recorded tidal 
height was 4.44 m above the Riachuelo Tidal Datum (RTD), and water reached the Mitre 
Railroad, 500 m away from the coast, breaking some of its tracks (D’Onofrio et al., 1999).  It 
then follows that rail disruption would be significant where main terminals, such as Retiro in 
BA, are exposed to frequent floods and disruption, or where rail disruption implies long 
alternative route diversions (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2005).  Unfortunately, flood prevention or 
mitigation measures can rarely prevent rail transport disruptions (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2005).   
 A recent 2016 World Bank study has assessed traffic disruption costs in BA, but only in 
the Maldonado and Vega Basins.  Flood effects on traffic were assessed by counting the 
additional time, fuel and distance that vehicles needed to travel to find alternative routes that 
were not blocked by flood waters (World Bank, 2016).  Researchers measured the number of 
vehicles and their passengers crossing selected road intersections, and the distance required to 
find alternate routes from a specific intersection during the floods.   
 The monetary value of time wasted by people left without the means to move from a 
specific place was also evaluated by the World Bank (2016), based on the number of houses in 





duration of flooding at different recurrence intervals.  The World Bank (2016) researchers 
assumed that 50% of the affected population would be in their houses, or going to their houses, 
at the time of the flood.  
 It should be considered that disruptions to traffic, and the resulting interference in 
production and supply chains, can also affect areas adjacent to flooded zones (Messner et al., 
2006).  The city of BA is one of the main transport and supply chain nodes in Argentina, so 
outlying areas rely on the smooth operation of its transport networks.  Therefore, this research 
enlarges the analysis of transport disruption beyond the Maldonado and Vega Basins, and 
includes areas outside the city that depend on BA as a supply node.  These outlying areas are 
highly vulnerable to flooding impacts as well, making their inclusion significant in the overall 
analysis.  
 
Economic losses.  
 Vehicle damage.  A study conducted for the City of Ryde, Australia (Bewsher 
Consulting Pty Ltd., 2009) measured vehicle damage by considering the average number of 
vehicles per household.  Briene et al. (2002, as cited in Messner et al., 2006) assessed the cost of 
losses to private vehicles being driven at the time of the study based on market values of cars and 
linear depreciation.  Pfluegner (2001, as cited in Reese & Ramsay, 2010) also proposed 
thresholds for different types of vehicle damage; they based their conclusions on laboratory tests.  
At 0.3 m, they found that water can reach the base of vehicle doors, damaging the floor, seats 
and interior fixtures, which represents a 25% loss; at 0.6–0.8 m, the electronic circuit is 






 The time of the flood is a critical factor in the calculation of vehicle damage, because at 
different times of the day, varying numbers are assumed to be on the road.  Researchers believe 
that 25% of vehicles will be travelling during working hours, and 90% will be on the roads 
during non-working hours (Bewsher Consulting Pty Ltd., 2009).  Despite these variances, 
sufficient advance warning might allow people to move their vehicles to safe areas and reduce 
the losses, no matter the time of day.   
 All the factors discussed above, which clearly affect vehicle damage estimates, such as 
average number of vehicles per household, depreciation, and flood depth and time, are 
considered in this research.  In this thesis the influx of cars from suburban areas that enter the 
city daily is also considered to be a significant factor.   
 
 Damage to property and contents.  The evaluation of direct or indirect flood damage to 
properties and their contents can be developed based on flood characteristics, such as the area 
flooded, flood depth, duration and velocity of the water (Reese & Ramsay, 2010), all of which 
generate different degrees of damage.  Depth–damage curves (Figure 5) are useful for estimating 
the percentage of damage from floods, or the direct and indirect effects on different assets.  
Direct damage can be understood as a damage ratio based on full replacement cost (Remo et al., 
2016), as repair costs in relation to replacement cost, or as a damaged state (Reese & Ramsay, 
2010).  Indirect damage relates to population displacement, loss of income, disruption costs and 







Figure 5.  Depth–damage functions in relation to inundation depth (depth in structure) (Nastev & Todorov, 2013). 
 
 As stated by various authors (Merz, Kreibich, Schwarze, & Thieken, 2010; Messner et 
al., 2006; Reese & Ramsay, 2010), different types of depth–damage curves can be generated 
depending on the sources of information.  Empirical curves are determined by using empirical 
data gathered from historical floods and the damage they caused, while expert evidence or 
damage data collected via “what-if” scenarios can help to create hypothetical or synthetic curves.  
The use of both types of curves reduces the limitations of each method (Reese & Ramsay, 2010).  
 Building categories (residential, commercial and industrial) and their contents also have 
significant influence on depth–damage curves.  Structural costs are often estimated from 
publications that specify mean square foot costs for various types of buildings (U.S. Federal 
Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], n.d.).  Content damage values are estimated by 
insurance companies from an average value, either a depreciated or a full replacement value 
(Briene et al., 2002 as cited in Messner et al., 2006), or from official statistics (Čihák et al., 2005 
as cited in Messner et al., 2006).  Other methods include the estimation of content value per 
square metre of living area (Meyer, 2005 as cited in Messner et al., 2006), or as a percentage of 





[USACE], 2003).  The Canadian version of Hazards U.S. (HAZUS) software, a tool for 
quantifying risks from natural hazards, considers the content damage value as 50% of structural 
values for residential buildings, 100% for commercial buildings and 150% for industrial 
buildings (Nastev & Todorov, 2013).  The HAZUS approach is more suitable for BA, as no 
official data exist on content values or costs of damage caused by previous floods, differentiated 
between building uses.  
 
 Property damage reduction.  As reported by Messner et al. (2006), property damage 
reduction estimates can be made as a function of flood depth, number of storeys, building use 
category (not individual buildings) and warning lead-time (e.g., < or >8 h).  Warning lead-time is 
understood to be the time between when a warning message is issued by government agencies 
and the start time of the floods.  
 Flood warnings play an important role in decreasing residual risk to flood control 
infrastructure (Messner et al., 2006).  Warnings allow people to reinforce or place temporary 
flood defences and to shift vulnerable house contents (furniture, computers and supplies) to a 
higher floor or second storey, thereby reducing economic losses.  Even in buildings without 
second storeys, inhabitants can manage to move contents and reduce damage to them (Penning-
Rowsell & Green, 2000; Smith & Ward, 1998).  
 Other methods have been applied abroad to estimate damage reduction, as in the City of 
Ryde, Australia (Bewsher Consulting Pty Ltd., 2009), where a fixed reduction factor (0.96), 
based on flood awareness and effective warning time (1 hour), is used.  The calculation of a 
flood-reducing factor, which account, for example, for flood control infrastructure or warning 





flood warnings.  Therefore, the response to warnings, and reducing factors, might differ between 
the Australian and Argentinian cultures.  Furthermore, in accordance with Handmer (2000), 
social changes and technological improvements can alter the effectiveness of flood warnings.  
The quantification of damage reduction in monetary terms might lead to an oversimplification of 
the diverse responses to flooding warnings; however, it is a useful tool for the appraisal of flood 
management measures and warning schemes (Messner et al., 2006).   
 
 Post flood clean-up.  Property clean-up time and costs can be estimated by evaluating 
property size and use, flood depth, damage ratio, hourly labour rate and post event average clean-
up time.  Average clean-up time and costs are quite diverse in the literature.  For instance, 
average clean-up time after flood events in New Zealand is 12 days, based on a range of 2–40 
days (Reese & Ramsay, 2010).  Costs vary from NZD 12,400 for water levels lower than 0.1 m 
to NZD 21,700 for levels greater than 0.1 m (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2005).  The Department of 
Environment, Climate Change and Water in New South Wales, Australia, has estimated a figure 
of AUD 4,000 (≈ NZD 4,350) per flooded house for clean-up and alternative accommodation 
costs (Bewsher Consulting Pty Ltd., 2009).  Reese and Ramsay (2010) adopted a simple method 
based on the estimated clean-up time and an hourly labour rate per building category, which is 
more suitable for BA, where there are no official records of clean-up costs.  
 
 Emergency costs.  Emergency costs are associated with emergency services and relief.  
Several studies have reported emergency costs as a percentage of total property losses.  These 
estimations vary from 2.2%–10.7%, based on different sizes of flood-affected areas, and flood 





cited in Pfurtscheller & Schwarze, 2008; Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013; Penning-Rowsell & 
Wilson, 2006).  These values will be considered for BA, as emergency costs from previous flood 
events have not been made publicly available.  
 
 Indirect flood losses.  Indirect flood effects are hard to estimate, mainly because of the 
scarcity of accurate data and business confidentiality issues.  Penning-Rowsell et al. (2005) have 
suggested avoiding the topic entirely, because indirect impacts do not represent a significant 
value.  Indirect impacts tend to be smaller than direct impacts, usually less than 25% or even 
10% of total direct impacts costs; greater indirect damage has been registered when traffic 
disruption and clean-up costs were large (Reese & Ramsay, 2010).  This thesis will focus on 
direct effects and will not quantify indirect impacts.  
 
Emergency Response and Evacuation     Different actions can be implemented to address risk, 
such as doing nothing, avoiding, reducing, transferring or mitigating the risk.  Emergency 
response is an effort to mitigate the risks inherent in impacts caused by an incident, and can 
include firefighting, administering medical treatment, rescue or evacuation (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, n.d.).  Diverse types of evacuation can be carried out on a small to a large 
scale, pre- or post-event, immediate or pre-warned (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
n.d.).  
 In an evacuation, the number of people looking for shelter can vary, because only a 
percentage of displaced people will search for public shelter.  Usually these are low-income 
people.  Some people will try to find temporary shelter despite minimum or no damage to their 





Rowsell et al., 2013), or by using FEMA’s logarithmic function, which considers building 
damage and the time people must spend in temporary accommodation while repairs to their 
former homes are carried out.  If building damage is less than 10%, no displacement is expected; 
if the damage is greater, then displacement can take from 30–365 days (FEMA, 2001).   
 Collecting post flood event data in BA would be valuable as a test of the 10% damage 
threshold, which proved to be lower in the 2004 Manawatu–Hutt Valley, New Zealand floods 
(Reese & Ramsay, 2010).  Relocation costs can be derived from the number of evacuated 
householders remaining in temporary accommodation (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013), or as a 
function of house floor area, rental costs per day, disruption costs and the probable evacuation 
time per damage state, which refers to the level of damage to buildings, as per HAZUS (a multi-
hazard loss estimation software and damage database) protocols (FEMA, n.d.).  Penning-Rowsell 
et al.’s (2013) approach seems more appropriate for BA because of the limited data available 
from past flood events in and around the city.  
 Pre-event flood modelling can optimise evacuation time and clearance.  The complexity 
of modelling potential evacuation routes and zones can be addressed by the interfaces between 
different disciplines — transport planning, engineering and social sciences (Alabdouli, 2015).  
Various evacuation models have been proposed for different hazards.  The most commonly used 
are agent-based models (ABMs) and geographic information system (GIS) analyses, such as the 
least cost path distance (LCPD) model.  The ABM models explore interactions between and 
decision-making processes of individuals or organisations (D’Orazio et al., 2014; Medina, 
Sanchez & Vojinovic, 2016; Yin et al., 2014).  The LCPD model ignores social variables, and 





fuel) to estimate the minimum cost of travel associated with evacuation (Le, 2016; Wood, Jones, 
Schmidtlein, Schelling, & Frazier, 2016).   
 In BA, evacuation centres have been established at sports complexes (GCABA, 2009), 
but no published literature describes evacuation models for the city.  Despite the lack of 
evacuation models, improvements have been made in the legal framework.  City authorities have 
developed an emergency management plan (GCABA, 2009), which establishes the 
responsibilities of each governmental agency during an emergency. In addition, a dedicated 
emergency coordination and control centre (CUCC) has been set up.  At the same time, 
Argentina is currently developing a national plan for disaster risk resilience (DRR).  
 
The Risk Management Process 
 Risk management provides a framework to deal with the complexities of risk assessment 
and risk treatment, process of selecting measures to modify risk, in BA.  It involves various 
phases that provide structure to the process and make it repeatable internationally.  Risk 
management is also scientifically based, contributing to its transparency and credibility.  As 
defined by Standards New Zealand (2009), the risk management process includes stages that are 







Figure 6.  The risk management process (Standards New Zealand, 2009).  
 
 There are three main commonly accepted risk management phases (Establishing the 
context, Risk assessment and Risk treatment), which are supplemented by Communication and 
consultation and Monitoring and review, outlined below. 
Establishing the context implies the identification of clear objectives and scope of the 
study or project; the nature of the risk; quantification units and methods; the planning framework 
(systems, protocols, national or local regulations); authorities and responsibilities; risk 
implications in the social, economic, environmental and political fields; and values associated 
with assets at risk.  
Risk assessment includes the identification, analysis and evaluation of hazards, risk 





and climate change risk maps, mapping of vulnerable buildings and areas such as slums, 
hospitals, schools and retirement homes (GCABA, 2015a; MAyDS, n.d.).  
Risk identification incorporates diverse methods to identify risks, which at this stage are 
generally qualitative.  The risk identification toolkit includes preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), 
the structured what-if technique (SWIFT), hazard and operability studies (HAZOPS), the failure 
mode and effects analysis (FMEA), hazard mapping and interviews.  An evaluation of 
objectives, expectations and necessary resources is also developed.  The input of different 
stakeholders is beneficial at this stage, as diverse stakeholders can provide local knowledge and 
first-hand experience.  Furthermore, interaction with the community can help to build trust, 
which will be beneficial when the community must put action plans into practice later.   
Risk analysis includes a quantitative, qualitative or semi-quantitative analysis, depending 
on the method and unit measurements selected when establishing the context.  Available 
resources and data play important parts in determining the most suitable method for evaluating 
risk significance and any residual risk.  
In this thesis, we have performed a semi-quantitative analysis to assess BA infrastructure 
lifelines and critical utilities disruption.  This type of analysis was the most appropriate choice 
because data describing utilities service areas and infrastructure lifelines in BA are lacking.  We 
measured lifeline and utilities disruption by assessing potentially affected populations living 
around assets prone to flooding.  
Quantitative analyses can be developed by using various approaches, including 
deterministic and probabilistic analyses.  The Lecertua (2010) BA flood model that underpins 
this project was based on a probabilistic hydraulic model, which was developed using historical 





and distribution of flood events.  Lecertua (2010) also used the IPCC A2 scenario (IPCC, 
2001b), in which the mean sea levels increase by 19 cm in the year 2030 and by 50 cm in the 
year 2070, to determine future flood scenarios.  Flood levels served as indicators of damage to 
building structures and contents.  
Risk evaluation is a process whereby risk is evaluated by an objective method.  The 
objective is to minimise the effects of personal perceptions on risk analyses.  Personal, subjective 
perceptions are influenced by social values, fears, unfamiliarity and the need for personal 
control.  Perceptions of uncontrolled risk, voluntary or involuntary risk, event frequency and 
event size are also subjectively derived conclusions that can be removed from risk analyses 
through careful evaluation.  The ultimate goal is to determine whether a risk is acceptable, 
tolerable or intolerable, depending on the context evaluated in the first phase.  
The concept of tolerable risk was developed by Layfield (1987).  A tolerable risk is 
defined as a risk that people are prepared to tolerate in order to receive benefits.  Following the 
Layfield (1987) as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) criteria, risk levels can be classified 
as intolerable or tolerable — within the ALARP region, risks are acceptable.  
The objective risk evaluation process provides valuable information for the development 
or revision of strategies and action plans, as well as for decision making, because resources and 
time can be prioritised to reduce unacceptable risks.  Risk managers can assist regulators, 
planners and communities at risk by organising statistics, thresholds, comparisons and 
alternatives into a plan for dealing with flood risk.  
Risk treatment occurs once experts assess and classify risk against set criteria.  Decisions 





and opportunities to all parties, are evaluated.  Risk treatment can include different type of 
actions, such as: 
 Avoidance.  Actions taken directly on the hazard or exposure can avoid risk.  
This might imply restructuring a whole project, or changing some of its 
parameters, to avoid or scale down the risk to acceptable or tolerable levels.  
For instance, land developers can modify the location of a new project to 
avoid low-lying areas that are prone to flooding.  In the south of BA, 
vulnerable communities were relocated to promote native riparian planting 
and restore the floodplain area (GCABA, 2015a).   
 Reduction.  Reduction describes actions taken to diminish the likelihood of the 
event, for example by constructing flood, storm surge and wave protection. 
For example, the breakwater protecting BA port.  
 Mitigation.  Mitigation actions reduce the impacts of the event.  Mitigation 
can include using water-resistant construction materials for infrastructure and 
building projects, sandbagging properties or encouraging infiltration by 
increasing the permeable area (e.g., the use of green roofs in government 
buildings in BA) (GCABA, 2015a). 
 Transfer.  A community can share risk between various parties, who can 
manage potential consequences as a group.  Risk quantification can help in 
this transfer process to ensure risk allocation is not done subjectively or 
arbitrarily.  One of the parties compensates the other after a flood event 
because a previous exchange of benefits occurred when the two parties faced 





companies can allocate flood risk between them, which allows them to better 
manage impacts by sharing resources. Currently in BA, standard household 
policies do not include flood coverage, which have to be especially requested 
by the insured (Barachetti, 2016).  
 Doing nothing.  In this scenario, risks and resultant impacts are accepted, so 
measures to combat them are not implemented. This approach was adopted 
until recently, since the BA council used to only respond to emergencies 
(González, 2005; Koutsovitis & Goyeneche, n.d.; Sejenovich & Cock 
Mendoza, 2000). 
 Structural measures.  Coastal defences and floor level rises in the La Boca 
neighbourhood of BA (Barros et al., 2006), vertical drainage wells in the 
Matanza–Riachuelo Basin (Golder Associates & Deltares, 2017), increased 
drainage system capacity (e.g., in the Maldonado, Vega and Medrano Basins) 
and retention ponds in Sarmiento Park, BA (GCABA, 2015a) are all good 
examples of practical risk treatments.  
 Non-structural measures.  In the social arena, BA City council staff have 
trained vulnerable groups and BA public agencies to respond to floods.  They 
have also assisted with native plantings around flood-prone areas.  In addition, 
authorities have arranged the relocation of vulnerable communities living by 
the Riachuelo River, and have created the Communication and Environmental 
Education Programme known as “PROCEAH” (GCABA, 2015a).  Updates 
have been made to the BA urban (Ministry of Urban Development and 





2009), and new institutional groups have been formed to deal with flood risk 
(e.g., the Committee for Emergency Attention and the Flood Risk 
Management Council).  The implementation of a programme to monitor water 
levels in the BA drainage system, and the Hydrometeorological Observation, 
Vigilance and Alert System known as “SIHVIGILA”, have contributed to 
improving flood prevention measures in BA. 
 
 Monitor and review is performed continuously during the risk management process to 
calibrate models and to test the appropriateness of decisions taken during each stage as new 
regulations, information, technology or flood models become available.  Evaluating if goals are 
being achieved can also indicate the necessity of reviewing the risk management process.  We 
performed a review of risk concepts in this thesis by studying existing published literature and 
regulations.  
Communication and consultation with various stakeholders can enrich the whole risk 
management process, as it allows identification of the needs and perspectives of the community, 
or risk management organisations.  Consultation also allows people involved to appropriately 
assess risk, and provides them with suitable risk treatment options.  In BA, this phase has 
included consultation with local authorities (the Undersecretary of Emergencies, the General 
Directorate of Emergency Planning and Coordination of Firemen and the Emergency 
Coordination and Control Centre); and international contributors including BA and Canterbury 
Civil Defence; RiskScape developers (GNS Science and the National Institute of Water and 
Atmospheric Research [NIWA]); British Columbia (BC) Housing Canada; and the University of 





fostered a broad understanding of the BA risk management approach in light of successful 
experiences that have been implemented overseas, which can be tailored to BA’s need to 
improve risk management.  
 
Research Aims and Objectives 
 The aim of this research is to examine flood vulnerability and response capacity in BA, 
Argentina under current conditions and in future scenarios.  The principal objectives are: 
 To determine flood impacts on buildings and infrastructure lifelines under current 
conditions and future scenarios that consider sea level rise (Chapter 2). 
 To identify which factors (e.g., land price or housing density) have the greatest effect on 
increasing flood spatial vulnerability (Chapter 2).  
 To characterise populations exposed to floods and to propose evacuation routes for their 
use in emergencies (Chapter 3).   
 To determine if any current BA emergency and urban plans increase flood impacts or 
undermine the emergency response capacity of BA in any way (Chapters 2 and 3).  
 To propose appropriate flood mitigation measures for BA under current conditions and in 
the face of projected flood impacts resulting from sea-level rises projected for the 21st 
Century (Chapter 4). 
 
Research Approach and Thesis Structure 
 This thesis is structured as four chapters (Figure 7).  Thesis structure mirrors the three 
main stages of the risk management process itself (Establishing the context, Risk assessment and 
Risk treatment).  Chapter 1 describes the context of the project, the study area, aims and 





hazards in Buenos Aires, flood modelling, impact assessment methods, emergency response, 
evacuation and the risk management process.  
 Chapter 2 focuses on flood impacts in Buenos Aires and is divided into three topics: 1) 
determination of flood-prone areas; 2) discussion of damage to infrastructure lifelines and 
utilities; and 3) exploration of economic losses, which include damage to buildings and their 
contents and vehicles, and post-flood clean-up and emergency costs.  
 The La Plata River flood model, statistical information and georeferenced data describing 
infrastructure lifelines, critical utilities and buildings are used to identify the flood-prone areas 
and exposed assets.  Also used was available local information to determine damage costs and 
the spatial distribution of flood damage.  A quantitative risk analysis was subsequently 
performed in ArcGIS 10.3, a geographic information systems (GIS).  Depth–damage functions 
were used, which express flood depth and damage as a percentage of replacement cost, to 
estimate the cost of damage to BA buildings and contents.  Comparisons were made according to 
building use category, neighbourhoods, risk control methods and flood scenarios.  
 Outputs of impact modelling, such as maps, tables and graphs showing building damage, 
lifeline disruption and flood-exposed areas, were used to evaluate flood risk for BA.  Aspects 
such as colour schemes (Harrower & Brewer, 2003), plus quantitative risk information, were 
considered to facilitate the interpretation of maps and figures, as per established methodology 
(Rakow, Heard, & Newell, 2015).  
 Chapter 3 explores exposed populations in BA, their evacuation and specific emergency 
responses.  In the risk identification phase, populations in flood-prone areas of BA were 
characterised quantitatively, based on demographic variables (e.g., gender, age, income and 





data available in BA to estimate the number of evacuees per neighbourhood in each flood 
scenario, and costs of temporary accommodation for the first several weeks following a flood 
event.  Factors that increase flood vulnerability and influence population displacement were also 
analysed.  Vehicle and pedestrian evacuation routes for BA were produced using the Network 
Analyst tool in ArcGIS 10.3 to estimate evacuation times and the number of evacuees that will 
arrive at different destination points.  
 A review of BA risk treatment strategies established in the urban and emergency 
planning framework, and interviews with officers in the local BA council and civil defence 
organisations, were also carried out to better understand the risk planning framework and its 
influence on BA emergency response systems.  Fire stations’ responses in scenarios with and 
without floods were analysed to better understand how flooding can disrupt traffic and 
emergency responses.  Fire stations and staging point service areas were evaluated together to 
estimate how flood response in BA can be improved. Maps are used to show evacuation routes 
and the location of emergency facilities, while graphs provide information on evacuation times, 
evacuees and temporary accommodation costs.  Uncertainties, data limitations, alternative 
methodologies and potential improvements are considered, as in Chapter 2. 
 Chapter 4, the conclusion of this research, is a review the main body of the work, and 
contains general recommendations to further develop the topic.  Successful experiences that have 
been implemented overseas and that can be tailored to BA’s needs to improve risk management 
are discussed.  In addition, specific future research in the area of flood risk management is 
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Characterising Flood Losses: A Methodological Comparison 
Introduction 
 Between 1984 and 2004, BA suffered 37 flood events (World Bank, 2005), equating to 
more than one event per year and losses in millions of USD.  In April 2013, for example, flood 
damage was in the order of USD 300 million (World Bank, 2016).  Natural and anthropogenic 
processes combined to result in flood vulnerability being more significant than in the past 
(Lecertua, 2010).  
 Floods in BA occur as a result of two main natural causes: high-intensity rainfall and 
high tides affecting the La Plata River, usually exacerbated by the infamous Sudestada winds.  
Furthermore, the low gradient of the BA plains hampers water drainage (Clichevsky & Herzer, 
2000).  Climate variability has aggravated the issue: changes in wind intensity and average 
annual rainfall have increased impacts.  Sea level rises (1.6 mm/year) have also negatively 
affected La Plata River flood dynamics (D’Onofrio, Fiore, & Romero, 1994; Lanfredi, Pousa, & 
D'Onofrio, 1998).  
 These natural processes are exacerbated by urbanisation, which includes a gradual 
elimination of wetlands, armoured channelisation of waterways, and increases in impervious 
surfaces and associated runoff.  Population growth in BA has also increased vulnerability to 
floods, as more settlements have been established in low-lying areas with limited connections to 
functional sewage and water drainage systems; such systems are insufficient to cope with high-
intensity rainfall associated with even a 2-year flood recurrence (GCABA, 2014).  Settlements in 
vulnerable areas have been driven not only by the real-estate market, but also by credits and 





though the city is mostly developed, individual properties are still being replaced by multi-storey 
buildings; thus, higher population density and increasing vulnerability can be expected in the 
near future.  A flexible building code and a lack of control and enforcement have also 
contributed to increasing flood vulnerability.  
 The fact that a large coastal area of BA is within 5 m of mean sea level (Re & Menéndez, 
2005), and that the city is the most heavily populated area in the country, implies that many 
people and their properties are jeopardised directly or indirectly by floods.  Therefore, there is a 
need to examine flood impacts in BA under current conditions.  It is also pertinent to account for 
projected impacts of climate change, sea level rise and population growth in order to improve 
land-use planning and emergency management.  To wit, an assessment of flood damage can be 
an informative tool for many stakeholders, including the following: governments, who are 
evaluating policy and the cost–benefit ratios of flood mitigation measures; emergency managers, 
who need to know which areas are most endangered; insurance companies, who want to quantify 
flood risk and assign insurance premiums accordingly; and private landowners, who want to 
compare the costs of flood insurance or ask for damage compensation (Messner et al., 2006). 
 Consequently, the aim in Chapter 2 is to characterise flood impacts by using two 
approaches coupled with a damage reduction factor.  Furthermore, a flood loss index (FLI) is 
developed, which allows comparison of methodological approaches, to propose rational, well-
formulated flood mitigation strategies.   
 
Study Area 
 The city of BA is located on the “Pampas Plains” of BA Province, on the East Coast of 





200 km2 and is surrounded by the Riachuelo River to the south, and the La Plata River to the 
east, which is one of the main sources of flooding.  The city is the largest in the country (with 3 
million inhabitants), and 8.4% of its population resides in the officially demarcated flood 
inundation area.  As a centre for commerce, BA contributes 24% of GDP to the national 
economy (World Bank, 2016).  
 Between 1880 and 1930, the first wave of metropolitan expansion took place.  The city 
was chosen as the country's capital, which motivated the construction of the transport network in 
the central business district, located on the banks of the La Plata River.  A mass migration 
process took place until the 1930s, which led to an increase in population, land subdivision and 
the development of basic infrastructure.  Floods were an issue already in those years, because 
existing infrastructure did not take into account land topography.  Until the mid-19th Century, 
the areas affected by storm surges were not fully occupied, except for the downtown area of BA, 
which was later protected by flood-mitigating infrastructure (Barros et al., 2006), including 
riparian protections and the addition of substantial landfill.  In the 20th Century, urbanisation 
continued to occur at pace, with the emergence of slums, mainly in the south of BA.  
 In contrast to other cities in the U.S. and Israel, where wealthy people tend to build on 
higher ground (Felsenstein & Lichter, 2014), low-lying areas in BA are now inhabited by people 
of medium–high socioeconomic levels, particularly within the neighbourhoods of Nuñez, 
Belgrano, Palermo and Villa Crespo (Clichevsky & Herzer, 2000) to the north.  Other lower-
socioeconomic neighbourhoods, such as La Boca and Barracas to the south, are also frequently 






 Residential housing is the largest exposed asset, in comparison to non-residential 
buildings.  The city has approximately 1,426,438 residential properties, 227,088 commercial 
premises and 2,672 industrial buildings (GCABA, n.d.). 
 
Figure 8.  Location of BA in South America (red dot, top left insert), and the city’s 48 neighbourhoods. 
Note. Satellite image obtained from Geoeye and raw data from https://data.buenosaires.gob.ar/dataset (GCABA, n.d.), 
projected in Posiciones Geodesicas Argentinas (POSGAR) 2007. 
 
Methods 
 For this project, a flood damage assessment framework was developed using 





floods that can be used for calculating flood damage functions, the analysis relies on the Lecertua 
(2010) BA flood model, existing socioeconomic data and geographic information about the 
city’s infrastructure (Table 1), a dataset also used in other previously published studies 
(Karamouz et al., 2014; Mohammadi et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2006).  
 
Table 1  
Datasets Used to Generate a Flood Assessment Framework Specific to Buenos Aires (BA) 
 
Dataset Source 
BA flood model Lecertua, 2010 
Land use, census GIS data GCABA, n.d. (https://data.buenosaires.gob.ar/) 
Statistics (land and hotel prices, transportation 
figures)  
Buenos Aires Ciudad, 2016 
(http://www.estadisticaciudad.gob.ar/eyc/) 
Vehicle values  ACARA, 2017 
(http://www.acara.org.ar/guiaprecios/precios.php) 
 
 Delimitation of flood-prone areas.  The extent of flood-prone areas was calculated 
based on the Lecertua (2010) BA model for floods of different return periods, the estimated time 
interval between events of a similar size or intensity.  ArcGIS 10.3 was used to delimit the area.  
 
 Damage to infrastructure and utilities.  The damage assessment of lifelines and 
utilities includes an evaluation of the populations affected by direct flood effects on key 
infrastructure and services areas (Figure 9).  Having and disseminating information on the 
disruption of services is vital for city authorities, because it can encourage timely evacuation, 





and utilities can also prove key to emergency managers who need to know how many people will 
look for respite facilities outside the flooded area.  
 






 Water and gas.  Unfortunately, no detailed information about gas, water, wastewater, or 
stormwater systems in BA is publicly available; thus, a detailed evaluation of flood impacts on 
these facilities for the purposes of this research was not possible.  
 
 Telecommunications, power and health.  Data on telecommunications towers, thermal 
power plants, electricity substations, hospitals and health centres operating in BA were publicly 
available, and the effect of flooding on these lifelines was estimated using the BA-specific flood 
model and census data.  In each instance the number of potentially affected people was estimated 
within a 1 km radius of the flooded infrastructure.  
 
 Transport disruption.  Flood effects on the BA road network were analysed based on 
their connectivity with suburbs and industrial areas, as such linkages might impact on supply 
chains and commuters.  Road damage was not assessed per se, because impacts on roads are 
mainly produced by flow velocity and wave action, which are critical factors in flash flood areas, 
but not in flat areas like BA.  Furthermore, damage to road infrastructure usually represents less 
than 1% of total direct, tangible flood damage (Messner et al., 2006).  
 For the purposes of this project, disruption to the transport system was assessed by using 
statistics describing passengers travelling by train, bus, plane or ferry (GCABA, n.d.-a).  How 
maximum flood duration affected each means of transport in different flood scenarios was 
estimated.  Economic loss estimations were calculated using 2017 ticket values, and average 






 Utility interconnections.  Due to difficulties inherent in characterising the 
interconnection of utilities, the indirect effects of utility interdependencies are not encompassed 
by this study.  For example, fuel is needed for transportation, and transportation and road access 
are critical to reach sites where humanitarian aid or repairs are being carried out; electricity is 
required for pumps and telecommunications, and telecommunications are vital for emergency 
responses. 
 
 Cultural activities and the environment.  This research also encompassed impacts on 
cultural activities.  The aim was to evaluate the disruption to BA tourism and cultural life.  Fuel 
tanks and electrical transformers were located and counted to identify tourism or culturally 
significant areas that might be exposed to flood or fuel contamination.  The inclusion of cultural 
and environmental aspects enlarges the scope of the analysis, which would otherwise have been 
limited to a narrow analysis of infrastructure and direct, tangible damage.  
 
 Economic losses.  In this study, the estimation of economic losses from flooding includes 
vehicle, property, inventory, clean-up and emergency costs. 
 
 Vehicle damage.  Calculations of vehicle damage were based on three indicators: average 
number of vehicles per household (Ministry of Transport [Ministerio de Transporte], 2009) in 
flood-prone areas; the vehicles’ value after 8 years’ depreciation (82% of sale price) (Penning-
Rowsell et al., 2013), using the four best-selling cars in Argentina in 2016 for calculations 
(Association of Car Dealers of the Argentine Republic [ACARA], 2017); and flood depth.  Two 





during working hours (40 hours per week), and floods during non-working hours (128 hours per 
week), where 25% and 90% of cars are on the road, respectively.  It was assumed that cars per 
household in flood-prone neighbourhoods were inundated to equal depths unilaterally, either at 
0.3 m or at 0.6 m, which represents 25% and 100% damage, respectively, based on Pfluegner 
(2001, as cited in Reese & Ramsay, 2010).  Cars from suburban areas entering the city daily 
(except trucks and buses) were assumed to traverse flood-prone areas.  Losses of commercial 
vehicles were not included in this study, since these vehicles are considered to be a commercial 
property’s direct loss.  
 
 Property and contents damage.  Generic depth–damage curves developed in previously 
published literature and specific to coastal urban areas similar to BA were applied to evaluate 
flood impacts on buildings and contents.  Contents value was calculated as a percentage of 
structure value.  Curves were used from the micro-scale risk evaluation of flood-prone coastal 
lowlands in Schleswig-Holstein (MERK) (Markau, 2003 as cited in Sterr et al., 2005) in 
Germany, plus an alternative to the HAZUS platform used in the U.S. (Karamouz et al., 2016) 
(Figure 10 to 12) to evaluate which method better fitted the study area.  Residential, commercial 







Figure 10.  Depth–damage curves for residential land use.  
 















































Figure 12.  Depth–damage curves for industrial land use.  
 
Given that the latest flood risk assessment study developed in BA (World Bank, 2016) did not 
establish differences in terms of building use category, specific depth–damage curves for each 
category (residential, commercial and industrial) were employed here.  In other words, loss 
calculations were based on damage to specific building use category, and not on individual 
buildings or on monetary losses caused by reduced functionality.  Damage to mobile homes and 
caravans was not addressed in this study, but can be inferred by evaluating the impacts on 
standard vehicles.  The effects on historical buildings, which was not analysed in this study, 
should be considered separately, as the replacement costs for their contents and renovations can 
be higher than for average residential, commercial or industrial buildings. 
 
 Residential damage.  For the purposes of this study, residential structural values were 
determined by each neighbourhood’s average land price, the number of residential properties 






















was based on the ratio of houses to apartments per neighbourhood. Census meshblock is the 
smallest geographic unit for which statistical data is reported in the national census. Use of 
weighted floor areas of census meshblocks, plotted as centroids in Figure 13c, did not lead to 
overestimations of flood damage in relation to the city’s footprint (Figure 13a) or raster files (a 
matrix of cells or pixels; Figure 13b) when compared to published damage data.  The city’s 
footprint and raster files probably would have caused overestimations due to the inclusion of 
non-built areas within property footprints.  This is why census centroids were chosen for the 
quantification of flood damage.  Building contents were estimated as 50% of structural value 
(Nastev & Todorov, 2013).  In order to avoid damage values equal to zero, flood depth was 
reclassified by considering the maximum value of each flood bin (e.g., 0–1 m).  This 







Figure 13.  Methodological differences of building damage assessment: a) footprint; b) raster; c) census centroids, 
the chosen method.  
 
Commercial and industrial damage.  The structural values of commercial and industrial 
buildings were derived from the floor area assigned to each use category, and from 
neighbourhood land values.  Contents values represent 100% and 150% of commercial and 






 Public infrastructure.  For the purposes of this thesis, public infrastructure damage was 
considered to be a percentage of damage in the residential sector, following the method adopted 
by the World Bank study (2016).  Their results showed that damage to public infrastructure in 
BA is equal to 4.3% of the damage to residences (World Bank, 2016). 
 
 Residential damage reduction.  Reductions in structural and contents damage were 
applied depending on warning lead-time (> or <8 h), following Penning-Rowsell’s (2013) 
method (Table 2).  The calculations consider Total potential damage (TPD), as the sum of 
structure and contents value; Potential inventory damage (PID), which was rounded to 50%, as 
contents value was assumed to be 50% of structural value (Nastev & Todorov, 2013) in the 
assessment of residential damage; Moveable inventory damage (MID), as a percentage of 
potential inventory damage; Reliability and availability (RA), households having received a 








Potential Damage Reduction to Residential Properties, BA (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013) 
Parameter Description Parameter value (%)  Calculation 
TPD  Total potential damage (structure + contents) 100 N/A 
PID  Potential inventory damage (as a % of TPD) 52 N/A 
MID  Movable inventory damage (as a % of PID) 41 N/A 
RA Reliability–availability (households having received a 
warning) 
30 N/A 
EF Effectiveness- % of property at risk saved with:  N/A 
 <8 h warning -time 56 N/A 
 >8 h warning -time 71 N/A 
TPD saved 
by 
<8 h warning -time 3.58 TPD * PID * MID * RA *E <8h 






 Commercial and industrial damage reduction.  Reduction factors in movable contents 




Direct Damage Reduction in Non-residential Movable Inventory, BA 





Reliability–availability (RA) 0.30 
Effectiveness (EF) 0.52 
Note.  All calculations were based on receipt of a flood warning lead-time >4 hours.  Table adapted from Penning-
Rowsell et al. (2013). 
 
 The flood loss index.  The FLI was calculated for each neighbourhood in BA’s flood-
prone areas.  In these calculations, building damage in the worst-case scenario only (in the year 
2070, with a 10-year flood recurrence) was considered.  The FLI, was calculated in a similar 
manner to the flood vulnerability index developed for the State of Illinois, in the U.S. (Remo et 
al., 2016).  The FLI was derived from a loss ratio (Lossratio), which incorporates flood loss and 
flood exposure of residential, commercial and industrial buildings (Equation 1) (Remo et al., 
2016).  
 






Then, a floodplain weighting factor (FPwf) was calculated to account for the ratio of 
neighbourhood areas (NHA) to exposed areas (NHEA) (Equation 2). 
 
FPwf = NHA / NHEA   (Equation 2) 
 
Finally, the FPwf was multiplied by the neighbourhood’s loss ratio to calculate the weighted 
flood loss ratio (WlossRatio) (Equation 3).  
 
WLossRatio = Lossratio × FPwf  (Equation 3) 
 
The WlossRatio score was normalised (0.0–1.0), so each neighbourhood flood loss score could be 
ranked and compared by using Equation 4: 
 
NLossRatio = LRi - LRmin / LRmax - LRmin, (Equation 4), 
 
where LRi is the WLossRatio for each neighbourhood, and LRmax and LRmin are the minimum and 
maximum WlossRatio. 
 
 Post flood clean-up.  In this study, property clean-up costs were estimated based on 
average clean-up times reported for previous flood events, and based on the Argentinian 
minimum hourly labour rate commonly paid for cleaning jobs (ARS 57.50, or approximately 
NZD 4), which was set in 2016 (Ministry of labor, employment and social security [Ministerio 





time spent by people off-work in clean-up and drying activities, but not on cleaning products or 
repairs.  Given that clean-up of commercial and industrial buildings might take longer or involve 
more complex tasks such as changing the electrical system, moving stock and heavy machinery, 
using a higher cost per hour in the calculations was considered (5% and 15% extra cost for 
commercial and industrial buildings, respectively).  Multiplication factors were applied to 
account for weather conditions, as it takes longer to dry properties during colder winter months 
(Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013).  Clean-up costs of the affected road network were based on data 
from a previous study by Reese (2003, as cited in Reese & Ramsay, 2010), which assumes a cost 
of USD 8.70/m2 of flooded road.  Calculations took into account average road width (6.55 m ) in 
BA (GCABA, n.d.). 
 
 Emergency costs.  Emergency costs refer to additional expenses incurred by the BA 
council and voluntary organisations to minimise flood effects on population and infrastructure, 
such as evacuation, relief, pumping water out of flooded buildings, hiring private contractors and 
efforts to prevent loss of vehicles and equipment (Pfurtscheller & Schwarze, 2008).  Normal 
operational costs of the city’s Undersecretary of Emergencies were not considered.  Given that 
losses are dependent on the study area and flood event characteristics, several studies have 
reported a range of emergency costs as a percentage of total property losses.  Therefore 
minimum (2.2%), median (4.7%) and maximum (10.7%) values for BA were considered based 








 Delimitation of flood-prone areas.  In Lecertua´s (2010) worst-case scenario resulting 
from a 10-year return flood in 2070, we found the total area in BA, likely to be flooded, to be 
approximately 46 km2, which represents 22.61% of the city’s current area.  We found maximum 
flood depth to be 4 m, 6 m and 7 m in the 1990, 2030 and 2070 scenarios, respectively (Figure 
14).  The most exposed neighbourhoods, where more than 50% of the land area was exposed to 
flooding in the 2070 10-year return flood scenario, were Villa Soldati, Puerto Madero, La Boca, 
Retiro, Villa Riachuelo and Palermo (Figure 15).  Slums also fell well within the flood hazard 
area, especially in the south of the city, highlighting the issue of social vulnerability in those 






Figure 14. Flood-exposed areas in BA based on various scenarios (for the years 1990, 2030 and 2070) and return 






Figure 15. Flood-exposed area (%) per BA neighbourhood to 10-year return flooding in the year 2070. 
 
Damage to infrastructure and utilities.  In some neighbourhoods, infrastructure lifelines and 
utilities are more exposed than in other neighbourhoods, a factor that influences the response and 
repair phases (Figure 16). Small increases in damage sustained by infrastructure lifelines and 
utilities could be seen in scenarios where floods recur every 2, 5 and 10 years (Table 4). In other 
words, damage to infrastructure lifelines and utilities is greater when floods recur every 10 years 












































Figure 16. BA infrastructure lifelines and utilities located in areas prone to 10-year return flooding in the year 2070 
(GCABA, n.d.). 
 
Small increases in damage sustained by infrastructure lifelines and utilities could be seen in 
scenarios where floods recur every 2, 5 and 10 years (Table 4). In other words, damage to 
infrastructure lifelines and utilities is greater when floods recur every 10 years than 2 years. 





Table 4.  
Damage to infrastructure lifelines and utilities in BA in different flood scenarios 





Highways Bridges Bus lines Train lines Airport Port 
1990 
2 2 0 17 2 1 0 
5 2 1 18 2 1 0 
10 2 1 22 2 1 0 
2030 
2 2 3 36 3 1 0 
5 4 7 54 4 1 0 
10 4 9 62 4 1 0 
2070 
2 4 7 54 4 1 0 
5 4 10 64 4 1 0 
10 4 10 80 4 1 1 
 
  




























2 0 1 1 0 5 13 0 19 
5 3 1 1 0 5 13 1 25 
10 5 1 1 0 5 13 1 29 
2030 
2 4 1 1 1 5 13 8 48 
5 5 1 1 1 5 13 12 70 
10 26 1 1 1 5 13 12 83 
2070 
2 5 1 1 1 5 13 12 72 
5 38 1 1 2 5 13 19 88 
10 38 1 1 2 5 13 22 100 
 
 The water treatment plant.   The BA water treatment plant General San Martín, on the 
northeast side of the city, lies in the flood-prone area, and could be impacted by 1–4 m of flood 
water, with waves and debris, damage to its pipes, machinery and electrical components and 
disruption of the treatment process.  Flood duration affecting the plant ranged from 1 h in the 
baseline 1990 scenario to 4 h in the year 2070, without considering repair time.  In these 





without potable water.  The water intakes in the La Plata River are already vulnerable to tidal 
influences and southerly winds that cause river level to rise in normal weather and tidal 
conditions (GCABA, 2010). 
Waste water is discharged into the La Plata River after being treated outside the city on 
the coast of the Berazategui District, which is also exposed to floods.  Results indicated that 
disruption to the waste water treatment plant might require retaining effluent until the plant’s 
storage capacity is reached; installing temporary storage facilities; or diverting effluent to 
operable facilities located in the north and west of the city.  The latter option seems like a very 
difficult and unlikely prospect.    
 
 The thermal power plant.  From the scenarios  generated for this study, it appeared that 
because of its location on the southeastern coast of BA, the Costanera thermal power plant 
(1,800 MW capacity), the only one in the city, may be exposed to 1 m floods lasting from 1–2 h.  
It provides power to part of the city and approximately 7% to the national power grid (National 
Board of Electricity [Enel] , n.d.).  Power outages are a major issue during a normal summer in 
BA, as the electricity network is not extensive enough to cope with BA’s rapid population 
growth.  This situation can be worsened by southerly winds, which are recurrent during the 
summer season, and which cause floods that may affect the thermal power plant.  Fuel tanks 
located at the power plant could be a potential source of contamination if they are damaged by 
floods. 
 
 Substations and telecommunications towers.  Flood-affected populations within 1 km of 





total (16% of the total population).  Estimates were even higher when considering populations 
within a 1 km radius of substations outside the city boundaries.  To combat power outages, 
mobile substations and generators would be necessary, especially in hospitals, in retirement 
villages where people are dependent on electricity to stay alive, and at emergency management 
facilities where vital communications depend on the power supply (fire brigades, police stations, 
civil defence headquarters and the city’s Emergency Coordination and Control Centre [CUCC]).  
At the moment, the General Directorate of Logistics and Civil Defence are able to provide 23 
generators of different capacities to assist vulnerable populations and governmental agencies 
(Buenos Aires Civil Defence, 2016; General Directorate of Logistics [Dirección General de 
Logistica], 2016).   Also, a VHF radio system and alternative batteries are available to BA 
emergency managers to guarantee communication during emergencies. 
 Furthermore, if telecommunications towers in the hazard area were damaged, the number 
of affected people within a 1 km radius of the towers would number 11,231 city inhabitants (6% 
of total BA population).  The scenarios generated indicated that larger impacts can be expected if 
visitors or workers within the coverage area are taken into account.  Interruptions in the 
telecommunications network can hinder the issuance of flood warnings to the population, and 
can thwart emergency response efforts.  Temporary transmitter towers, satellite entrance links, or 
mobile microwave repeaters will be necessary to lessen the impacts, recently acquired by the city 
council (J. Granvillano, Emergency Coordination and Control Centre, personal communication, 
10th January, 2017).  In the scenarios generated by this project, telecommunications towers could 
be affected by floods of up to 2 hours, and substations could be hit by floods lasting a maximum 
of 4 hours.  However, these calculations did not include the time needed to restore 






 Hospitals and health centres.  Five hospitals and 13 health centres in the BA 
metropolitan area are likely to be affected by riverine floods.  Results showed that these health 
facilities could be affected from ground level up to 3 m in the 2070 scenarios.  People living 
within 1 km of these facilities amounted to 8% of the total city population.  Calculations also 
indicated 13% of the total population in BA lives within 1 km of community health centres in the 
flood-prone hazard area, and they might not be able to use the facilities when floods restrict 
access.  Staff working in flood-prone areas, and people from suburban areas who use the city's 
healthcare facilities, could also be included in impact assessments, making for higher impacts. 
 If health centres and hospitals are shut down, or if their services are limited during floods, 
patients will need to travel longer distances to reach other centres.  Consequently, facilities 
receiving patients from flooded areas will probably be overcrowded.  In this case, more resources 
and staff will be necessary to respond to the greater demand.  In addition, power outages or loss 
of equipment and medical resources should also be considered in flood scenarios.  Current 
project results showed that hospitals and health centres could be affected by floods lasting a 
maximum of 3 h in the year 2070–10-year return flood scenario.  
 
 Transport disruption.  Access to the city can be limited due to direct impacts or debris 
blocking roads, highways, highway ramps and bridges.  Our results showed that access in the 
east of BA will be limited, as Ramon Castillo and Del Libertador Avenue highway ramps will be 
exposed to floods, which will make access to Highway Illia difficult.  Highway Illia connects 
eastern areas of BA to the northern and south-eastern areas of the city.  In addition, current 





access the city during floods, as Highway Campora in the south-west, and Highway Frondizi and 
the BA–La Plata Road in the south-east will be affected by floods, as they were in 2013 (UNLP, 
2013).  Highway Illia and Campora will be affected in all scenarios, while Frondizi and BA–La 
Plata will only be affected in future scenarios (in the years 2030 and 2070).  Furthermore, 
impacts on bridges or their access ramps may also hinder traffic flows in and out of the city, 
especially in future flood scenarios.  Bridges thus affected included La Noria, Bosch, E. 
Demonty, Pueyrredon, Nuevo Pueyrredon, Victorino de la Plaza, Avellaneda, Barraca Peña in 
the south, and Figueroa Alcorta and Labruna in the east.  
 The connection of BA with other metropolitan areas is very important, because there are 
more than 2 million commuters who enter to the city daily to work and study (World Bank, 
2016).  Product and service supply chains can be adversely affected as well, because industrial 
complexes are mainly located on the outskirts of the city.   
 Transport disruption can also be measured by total affected passengers, average ticket 
value and flood duration.  Results indicated that flood scenarios and recurrence periods are 
directly related to transport disruption as flood duration increases.  Also, impacts can last longer 
than flood duration as extra time might be necessary to repair damaged infrastructure and to 
restore transport services.  More details about disruption to different means of transport are 
explained in the following sections.  
 
 City buses.  Results indicated that, in total, 80 bus lines could experience delays or 
disruption as they traverse inundated areas that could be flooded a minimum of 3 hours (as in the 
1990–2-year return flood scenario), or a maximum of 7 hours (as in the future year 2070–10-year 





in the baseline scenario of a 2-year recurrence, where maximum flood duration is 2 hours (Figure 
17).  Approximately 69,300 passengers (2% of the BA population) would be delayed or left 
without the means to return home.  The worst-case scenario proved to be the year 2070–10-year 
recurrence flood, where flood duration could scale up to 7 hours.  In this scenario, using local 
statistics (Buenos Aires Ciudad, 2016 ) of hourly passengers per bus line and ticket value, we 
found that 761,200 passengers (26% of the 2010 BA population) could be affected, and around 
USD 291,000 could be lost.  
 
 Train lines.  According to scenario results, the BA train lines that will be exposed to 
inundation in the future are General Mitre, Belgrano (North and South), San Martin and Roca.  
The baseline scenario (for the year 1990), regardless of the recurrence period, generated 
minimum losses of USD 5,800 to train lines, and affected a total of 24,900 passengers (0.8% of 
the BA population), with a worst-case flood duration of 3 hours.  Similar to bus route disruption 
results, the future year 2070–10-year recurrence scenario caused the most impacts.  In the future, 
train lines can be expected to be exposed to 6 hours of inundation that will affect 118,600 







Figure 17.  Affected passengers and financial loss due to transport disruption based on passengers per number of 
affected lines and 2017 ticket value. 
Note. Flood scenarios (1990, 2030 and 2070) and return periods (2, 5, 10 years) in the graph are separated with a 
dash (e.g. scenario 1990 – 2 year return flood). 
 
The airport and port.  Inundations at Jorge Newbery Airport could affect domestic and 
international flights to neighbouring countries, and the scenarios generated indicated passengers 
may be delayed from 2 hours or 5 hours in the 1990–2-year recurrence, and in the future year 
2070–10-year recurrence scenarios, respectively.  This flood scenario calculation showed that a 
minimum of 536, or a maximum of 1,339 passengers (either arriving or departing), would be 
delayed, based on local statistics of passengers passing through this airport (Buenos Aires 
Ciudad, 2016).   
 The BA port could be exposed to 1 m flood waters for 1 hour only in the year 2070–10-
year recurrence flood scenario, which would hamper an estimated 305 passengers and 738 
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and port should affect the least number of people.  However, economic losses may be greater, as 
ticket values for flights and infrastructure investments at the port and airport are higher than for 
other means of transport. 
 
 Cultural activities and the environment.  Scenarios indicated that the highly active 
cultural life of BA and tourism could easily be disrupted by future floods.  Popular museums, 
libraries, cultural centres and the “Galileo Galilei” Planetarium lie in the flood-prone area.  
Damage to them could exceed average impacts on other types of buildings, because the cost of 
renovations might be higher, and replacement of historical content may be more difficult.  Even 
if such special buildings and their contents were not flooded, access to them might become 
limited.  The loss of entertainment opportunities might further reduce the quality of life for flood 
victims and people outside the hazard area (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2005).  In addition, mapping 
indicated that approximately 5 km2 of parks, including Costanera, the only nature reserve in the 
city, are located in the hazard area, which if flooded, would constrain recreational opportunities 
and conservation efforts.   
 In addition, potential fire and contamination of soils, surface and groundwater can be 
expected if fuel tanks and the pipe system connected to them are severely scoured by flood 
waves and debris.  Controlling and extinguishing a fire, or immediate remediation, might be 
further complicated if the road network is fully inundated.  Damage to the city’s 47 fuel tanks 
may cause a petrol supply shortage needed for alternative transport or mobile generators in case 
of power outages.  Neighbourhoods exposed to fire and contamination include Palermo, Retiro in 
the east and La Boca to the south; however, impacts could extend to other areas if flood waters 





spread throughout the flood-prone area, and they are also a source of contamination, because 
they contain polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB), a bioaccumulative substance.  There is no 
information publicly available about the height at which transformers are mounted, so it is 
difficult to establish their level of exposure to flood waters. 
 
 Economic losses.  
 Vehicle damage.  32,447 vehicles were estimated to exist in BA’s flood-prone area, with 
897 cars entering the city daily (Buenos Aires Ciudad, 2016) amount to a total of 33,344 flood-
vulnerable cars (Table 5).  During working hours, 25% of the total number of cars is assumed to 
be on the road, which results indicated represents a minimum loss of USD 18 million and a 
maximum loss of USD 74 million in a 0.3 m or a 0.6 m flood, respectively.  Damage to vehicles 
during non-working hours could be higher, because 90% of vehicles are assumed to be on the 
road when people are not working.  In the case of a 0.3 m flood, USD 66 million could be lost, or 
USD 266 million in the case of a 0.6 m flood.  People have more chance of being affected by 
floods while commuting to and from their workplace than when driving to any other venue, as 
work-related travel generates 66.6% of all trips (Transport Secretariat [Secretaría de Transporte], 






Table 5  
Vehicle damage in BA based on 2016 values (ACARA, 2017) in different 2070 flood scenarios 
   
Lost value of vehicles on the road (millions 
USD)  
Scenario 
% of cars on 
the road 
Number of 
vehicles on the 
road 
0.3 m flood  >0.6 m flood  
Working hours 25 8,336 18 74 
Non-working hours 90 30,009 66 266 
Note. Vehicle damage calculations were based on average number of vehicles per household (Ministerio de 
Transporte, 2009) in flood-prone areas; percentage of cars on the road (Bewsher Consulting Pty Ltd, 2009); 2016 
vehicles value (ACARA, 2017); and flood depth damage (Pfluegner, 2001, as cited in Reese & Ramsay, 2010).  
 
 Property and contents damage. 
 Residential damage.  Total residential building-related flood losses were estimated to be 
USD 8,000 million (derived via HAZUS), or USD 6,800 (derived via MERK), in the less severe 
scenario (a year 1990–2-year recurrence); and USD 10,500 million (HAZUS), or USD 9,400 
million (MERK), in the worst-case scenario (a year 2070–10-year recurrence) (Table 6 and 
Figure 18).  Damage to residential housing increases as expected, with incrementally worsening 
flood scenarios and with increasingly long return periods.  Damage was worse in acute scenarios 
due to higher flood depths.  
 The largest scenario-based flood losses were concentrated in the neighbourhoods of 
Palermo, Barracas, Villa Soldati, La Boca, Puerto Madero, Retiro and Villa Lugano for all flood 
scenarios.  Mapping work revealed pockets, or small groups of census centroids, with higher 
building damage potential than surrounding cells, a variance mainly caused by higher population 





calculations indicated damage could be relatively high in comparison to surrounding census 
centroids because of the high housing density, as shown in the Figure 18a inset depicting damage 
values to slums in the Barracas neighbourhood.  This was in direct contrast to Puerto Madero, 
where results indicated higher building damage values per census centroid.  Figures were 
influenced by higher land prices, as shown in Figure 18d.
 
Figure 18.  Residential damage in the worst-case scenario (a year 2070–10-year flood event).  Structural losses as 
estimated by: a) HAZUS method; and b) MERK method.  Contents losses as estimated by: c) HAZUS method; and 





Commercial damage.  Commercial building and contents losses were directly related to the flood 
scenario and return period.  Aggregated commercial losses ranged from a minimum of USD 
36,400 million (via HAZUS method), or USD 35,700 million (via MERK method), in the year 
1990–2-year recurrence flood scenario.  Losses went up to USD 50,000 million (HAZUS), or 
USD 47,500 million (MERK), in the future year 2070–10-year recurrence scenario (Figure 19 
and Table 6).  The most affected commercial businesses in all scenarios were garages, 
storehouses, food and beverage retailers (including markets and restaurants), clothing stores and 
vehicle workshops.  
 Analyses of flood losses per census block showed that the greatest future flood impacts 
will probably be concentrated in the Belgrano, Palermo, Villa Soldati, Barracas and Nuñez 
neighbourhoods in all flood scenarios.  In this research, commercial building density was a 
paramount factor predicating commercial damage, especially in Belgrano (which has 1,000 
stores per km2 based on BA city council georeferenced data (GCABA, n.d)).  Because land price 
is very high in Palermo, Belgrano and Nuñez (>USD 2,800 m2), scenarios showed losses 
sustained in these neighbourhoods to be correspondingly high.  Floor area also exerted a 








Figure 19.  Commercial damage in the worst-case scenario (a year 2070–10-year flood event).  Structural losses 
estimated by: a) HAZUS method; and b) MERK method.  Contents losses estimated by: c) HAZUS method; and d) 
MERK method. 
 
Industrial damage.  Total industrial building-related flood losses in the city of BA could reach 
USD 320 million (via HAZUS estimation method), or USD 174 million (via MERK method), in 
the less severe scenario (a year 1990–2-year recurrence); and USD 468 million (HAZUS), or 
USD 322 million (MERK), in the worst-case scenario (a future year 2070–10-year recurrence) 





scenarios (in the years 2030 and 2070), when sea levels and flood depths may rise due to climate 
change.  Effects on industries were smaller in comparison to residential and commercial 
properties, because industrial endeavours are not currently the main economic earner in the city 
of BA.  In the industrial building category, the most affected buildings were sheds, carpentries 
and pharmaceutical factories.  
 Furthermore, flood impacts to industrial buildings and their contents may affect 
Belgrano, Recoleta, Retiro, Palermo, Barracas, Villa Soldati, La Boca, Nueva Pompeya and San 
Telmo industrial complexes, where building clusters are most concentrated.  Despite low land 
prices in the south of BA, results showed that the largest flood losses were concentrated in 
southern neighbourhoods (Barracas, Villa Soldati, La Boca and Nueva Pompeya), because the 
affected industrial land area is larger than in the north, where land prices are higher but total land 








Figure 20.  Industrial damage in the worst-case scenario (a year 2070–10-year flood event).  Structural losses 






Table 6  
Residential, Commercial and Industrial Building and Contents Damage  
Residential  
  
Building structures Contents 
Reduced total damage with 















2 5,067 1,454 111 2,986 5,432 -58 7,125 5,958 
5 5,117 1,479 110 3,016 5,487 -58 7,204 6,037 
10 5,134 1,487 110 3,026 5,506 -58 7,231 6,064 
2030 
2 5,329 1,592 108 3,144 5,717 -58 7,544 6,380 
5 5,763 1,810 104 3,403 6,195 -58 8,237 7,075 
10 6,058 1,962 102 3,578 6,517 -58 8,707 7,550 
2070 
2 5,802 1,829 104 3,426 6,238 -58 8,299 7,138 
5 6,218 2,063 100 3,678 6,686 -58 8,967 7,820 








Building structures Contents 
Reduced total damage with 
















2 7,424 4,086 58 29,025 31,620 -9 34,985 34,242 
5 7,450 4,098 58 29,070 31,667 -9 35,056 34,300 
10 7,469 4,106 58 29,104 31,702 -9 35,109 34,344 
2030 
2 8,113 4,382 60 30,300 32,947 -8 36,955 35,872 
5 9,531 4,987 63 32,767 35,547 -8 40,857 39,093 
10 10,582 5,437 64 34,716 37,584 -8 43,869 41,593 
2070 
2 9,670 5,045 63 32,976 35,777 -8 41,207 39,383 
5 11,546 5,836 66 35,818 38,889 -8 45,950 43,309 








Building structures Contents 
Reduced total damage with 
















2 79.2 36.7 73.4 241.0 137.9 54.4 306 160 
5 79.3 36.7 73.4 241.1 138.1 54.4 306 160 
10 79.3 36.7 73.4 241.1 138.1 54.4 306 160 
2030 
2 82.2 37.9 73.8 247.0 145.2 51.9 315 169 
5 97.5 44.2 75.3 278.6 183.1 41.4 362 213 
10 102.3 46.1 75.7 288.6 194.6 38.9 377 227 
2070 
2 97.6 44.2 75.3 278.6 183.2 41.3 362 213 
5 119.4 53.4 76.4 320.9 238.3 29.6 426 278 
10 129.3 57.8 76.5 338.9 264.5 24.7 454 309 
 
 
Note. All figures are shown in millions of US dollars (USD).  Damage figures other than those presented in the last 2 columns are for scenarios where no flood warnings were 
given.  Warning times for residential buildings are assumed to be <8 h, and for commercial and industrial buildings, warning times are assumed to be >4 h (Penning-Rowsell et 





The flood loss index.  The FLI (0 = low; 1 = high structure and contents loss) derived 
from both HAZUS and MERK calculations revealed that Parque Avellaneda was likely to 
be the most flood-affected neighbourhood, followed by Flores, San Telmo, Villa Lugano 
and finally, Recoleta.  The floodplain weighting factor (FPwf) had a considerable 
influence in Parque Avellaneda, Flores and San Telmo, while the loss ratio (Lossratio) was 
more important in calculations for Parque Avellaneda, Recoleta and Villa Lugano (Figure 







Figure 21.  Flood loss index (FLI) compared to total building damage in the worst-case scenario (the future year 
2070–10-year return flood) derived from HAZUS (Karamouz, Fereshtehpour, Ahmadvand, & Zahmatkesh, 2016) 
and MERK (Markau, 2003 as cited in Sterr et al., 2005) damage assessment methods. 
 
Damage reduction.  Residential potential damage costs with less than 8 hours flood warning 
time, which amounted to USD 900 million according to calculations (Table 6) represented, on 
average, 20% less savings in comparison to damage costs incurred after receiving a warning 
more than 8 hours prior to a flood event in the 2070-10 year flood scenario.  With more than 8 





et al. (2013) reduction factor.  In all scenarios, savings on damage costs to commercial assets 
with a warning time of more than 4 hours oscillated around USD 1.4 billion.  This represented an 
average of 2.8% savings on the total value of commercial contents in the flood-prone area of BA.  
With a warning time of 4 hours, savings realised for damage to industrial sites hovered around 
USD 14 million, which represented 2.1% of the value of industrial equipment.  
 
 Damage to public infrastructure.  Damage to public infrastructure was a mere 4.3% of 
the damage sustained by residential buildings.  Losses ranged from a minimum of USD 346 
million (according to HAZUS calculations), or USD 296 million (according to the MERK 
method), in the 1990–2-year recurrence scenario; and up to USD 453 million (HAZUS), or USD 
405 million (MERK), in the future year 2070–10-year recurrence scenario.  
 
 Post flood clean-up.  Residential property clean-up accounts for higher costs as more 
residences are exposed, in contrast to commercial businesses and industries.  Total cleaning 
expenses for residential, commercial and industrial buildings represented around USD 4 million, 
if an average clean-up of 14 h was used to calculate costs.  The average clean-up time of 14 h 
was used, because this figure has been reported as the average time required after floods in La 
Plata, Argentina ("Almost 50 deaths," 2013) (Table 7).  These values increased by 157% for 36 
hours of cleaning, a figure reported as the average clean-up time required after hurricane Katrina 
in New Orleans, in the U.S. (Riggs et al., 2008).   Calculations showed a 1957% increase in 
clean-up costs if 12 days (approximately 288 hours) were required, as registered after three flood 
events in New Zealand (Reese & Ramsay, 2010).  Factors of 2 and 5 were applied to total clean-





longer to dry properties and chattels during colder months.  Furthermore, calculations showed 
that road clean-up could add up to USD 25 million in BA, as 451 km of the road network lies 
within the flood-prone area. 
 
Table 7  
Post flood clean-up costs in BA based on building use category and cleaning hours 
Building type  
Minimum  Moderate  Maximum  
(14 hours) (36 hours) (288 hours) 
Residential  4,245,333 10,916,571 87,332,569 
Commercial   517,194 1,329,926 10,639,410 
Industrial 7,733 19,884 159,073 
Total 4,770,274 12,266,418 98,131,341 
 
   
Multiplication factor       
2 (Autumn) 9,540,547 24,532,835 196,262,682 
5 (Winter) 23,851,368 61,332,088 490,656,706 
Note. All figures are reported in US dollars (USD). 
 
 Emergency response costs.  Emergency response costs for BA in the least severe 
scenario (the year 1990–2-year return flood) could range from USD 986–USD 4.796 million, 
while in the worst-case scenario (the future year 2070–10-year return flood), emergency 






Table 8  
Emergency response costs 
  Emergency response costs (millions USD) 





   
1990 2 986 2,107 4,796 
2070 10 1,342 2,867 6,527 
 
Discussion 
 Flood losses estimated for the purposes of this study varied according to flood return 
period and scenario, land use, damage evaluation method, FLI, damage reduction factors, 
additional costs and economic factors.  Details about these variations are presented in the 
following sections.  
 
 Flood scenarios.  Small increases in building damage between return periods (of 2, 5 and 
10 years), due to higher flood waters commonly experienced with longer return periods, were 
evident.  Increments of variation between return periods were larger in the 2030 and 2070 
scenarios than in the baseline (the 1990 scenario).  Furthermore, losses were compounded in 
future flood scenarios (the year 2030 and 2070 calculations).  For example, total building 
damage rose by 23% from the 1990 to the 2030–10-year flood return scenarios.  The larger 
increases between flood scenarios highlighted the influence of climate change-driven sea level 
rises predicted for BA in the future.  Flood depths, sea level rises, the characteristics of flood-





contents losses.  These factors also drove the differences we observed in damage costs to 
different BA neighbourhoods. 
 
 Land use.  Flood damage to commercial business premises and their contents 
represented the greatest losses in the city, regardless of the damage evaluation method or flood 
scenario.  The effects on businesses exceeded those on residential properties, even though the 
number of houses is 159% higher in BA.  This discrepancy shows the weight that commercial 
contents (100% of structural value) play in calculations.  Contents damage to non-residential 
buildings was far greater than structural losses because of high contents value. This result relates 
to the fact that structural components tend to resist flooding, while non-structural components 
and contents are more perishable (Scawthorn et al., 2006). 
 The differences between damage sustained by commercial and industrial buildings are 
governed not only by the number of properties in the flood area and their floor area, but also by 
land value.  The number of industrial premises located in BA’s flood-prone area is significantly 
smaller — by approximately 200% — than the number of commercial buildings in the same 
area.  Furthermore, industries are mainly located in southern BA, where land is cheaper, while 
commercial businesses are widely dispersed across neighbourhoods. 
 Regarding public infrastructure, the fact that many governmental offices are in the city 
centre (the Recoleta, Retiro and San Telmo districts), well inside the flood-prone area, implies 
that many administrative and managerial activities will be interrupted during a flood, which 
might affect emergency response efforts.  Furthermore, the dedicated CUCC lies in the Chacarita 





as prone to waterlogging, which might limit access by hazard managers and local authorities to 
the centre.  
 Results clearly showed that the floods BA is likely to sustain will also affect 
infrastructure lifelines and utilities.  The magnitude of the damage and indirect effects depend 
mainly on flood depth, the duration of disruption and the availability of alternative sources of 
supplies. This conclusion was also arrived at by Scawthorn et al. (2006).  The fact that the 
General Directorate of Logistics and Civil Defence is able to provide only 23 generators shows 
the lack of equipment and degree of vulnerability of BA population. In addition, BA residents’ 
degree of dependence on other unaffected lifelines impacted disruption. 
 Based on these results, it can be concluded the timely, efficient management of 
information concerning flood risk areas and damage to buildings or infrastructural is critical to 
managing floods in BA.  Information regarding flood risk can inform land use planning, because 
activities with low damage potential can be allocated to flood-prone areas such as car parks, 
natural reserves and recreational areas (Messner et al., 2006).  To this end, the integration of 
flood damage and land use databases would be beneficial for informing building consent 
approvals, and also for property buyers wishing to make the right decisions.  In France, flood 
risk information can be found in a publicly available home information pack (known as the 
“Dossier de Diagnostics Immobiliers”), and in that country, property vendors and landlords are 
required to inform purchasers or tenants of potential flood risk to enable them to make more 
informed decisions (“Flood Risk Areas in France,” 2015).  Caution is required in implementing 
such a system, however, as this information made publicly available can influence market values 





 Damage evaluation methods.  Damage evaluation methods, such as MERK and its 
alternative HAZUS, are based on the same concept: depth–damage curves, combined with land 
use GIS data describing coastal urban areas (Karamouz et al., 2016; Markau, 2003 as cited in 
Sterr et al., 2005).  The MERK and HAZUS aggregated damage costs are not so disparate.  
However, when comparing building and contents damage, a significant difference can be noticed 
between the results these methods generate.  This is mainly due to different damage percentages 
assigned to each flood level, and the empirical data used to create depth–damage curves.  The 
HAZUS method is based on tax-lot level information, the smallest geographic unit for which 
properties statistical data can be collected, and contents values as a percentage of structural 
values, while MERK is based on field surveys of different types of buildings, and inventory 
values derived from household insurance companies.  The HAZUS alternative could be 
considered as a more refined flood damage assessment tool, because the scale of input data is 
more suitable in the BA context.  The HAZUS tool has been applied to Manhattan, New York, 
U.S.A., where building characteristics (construction type, materials used and age) seem to be 
more similar to building characteristics in BA.  In contrast, the MERK method has been used 
satisfactorily in Schleswig-Holstein, Germany, where building characteristics are not so similar 
to BA (Karamouz et al., 2016;  Markau, 2003 as cited in Sterr et al., 2005).  
 Nevertheless, it could be concluded that both methods overestimate damage values, since 
the direct damage in BA from the most recent flood (in April 2013) was equal to USD 300 
million (World Bank, 2016), while results obtained for a single building category — using both 
methods — yielded loss estimates in the billions of USD.  Therefore, there is a great need to 
develop a flood damage database and to adjust depth–damage functions to local conditions, land 





 The flood loss index.  The analysis of FLI yielded dissimilar results in absolute flood 
loss costs in the worst-case scenario (the year 2070–10-year return flood), because it not only 
covers residential, industrial and commercial structural and contents damage, but also the 
relationship with the flood-exposed area and assets.  The MERK- and HAZUS-aggregated 
damage costs are not that disparate, as can be observed in Figure 21, except for the 
neighbourhood of Palermo.  The different rankings obtained after the calculation of FLI and 
absolute values highlight the importance of choosing an appropriate quantification method, and 
of interpreting results according to local conditions, especially when using the FLI as a decision-
making tool.  Treading carefully with the FLI is also necessary because the aggregation of 
variables can mask certain variables, yielding incorrect conclusions. 
 
 Damage reduction.  More savings can be achieved with longer flood warning times, 
which highlights how important it is to develop a warning system and to train people on how to 
respond to it.  The estimation of damage reduction we undertook in this research can be refined 
using site-specific empirical data describing large-scale mitigation measures, people’s responses 
to warnings, their ability to protect their properties and their ability to shift movable equipment 
to second storeys.  
 
 Additional costs.  In addition to building and contents damage, flood impacts can 
increase when clean-up and emergency response costs are high.  The clean-up expenses incurred 
per property were generated through running scenarios for BA were significantly lower than 
those reported in the U.K. by Penning-Rowsell et al. (2005), who classified costs based on flood 





reported in an Australian study, which were AUD 4,000 (USD 3,144) (Bewsher Consulting Pty 
Ltd, 2009) a figure inflated by including the cost of time and money spent in alternative 
accommodation.  Regarding road clean-up, contractors might be needed to cope with the extra 
time required to remove flood debris, like sediment, branches damaged trees, waste or wreckage, 
from roads and drainage pipes in BA. Furthermore, emergency response costs in BA can be 
diminished if further investment is made in flood prevention measures and education to decrease 
dangerous behaviours during flood events. 
 
 Economic factors.  Total building damage and additional costs can also change based on 
other economic factors.  Fluctuations can be marked, particularly in Argentina, where the 
economy is quite unstable and annual inflation in 2016 reached 30% (Gasalla, 2017).  Variables 
like inflation, population growth and land development may increase losses, while deflation, 
vacant properties and flood mitigation measures may reduce losses.  
 
Flood mitigation.  The implementation of flood mitigation measures can potentially 
attenuate the flood impacts analysed previously.  The extent of the profits the city of BA could 
realise in implementing additional flood risk reduction measures has significant implications.  
 Those who do not benefit, or who partially benefit from flood adaptation strategies but 
still contribute to their development by tax payments or other means, are usually forgotten in the 
cost–benefit analysis of flood mitigation programmes (Penning-Rowsell & Pardoe, 2012).  For 
instance, certain households do not directly benefit from flood risk reduction as their properties 
are outside the hazard area, but they may profit from the fact that their jobs or the entertainment 





pleasure of charitable giving.  Other people may also benefit from the conversion of low-value 
floodplains to other, higher value uses.  At the same time, certain people may be affected by a 
reduction in flooding, particularly those in the construction industry and emergency services, 
who tend to experience greater demands and higher stress levels in the recovery process after 
large flood events.  
 Even though some social groups are willing to pay for the protection of others, as 
reported in the U.K. and U.S. (Messner et al., 2006; Shabman et al., 1998), the acknowledgement 
of both “winners” and “losers” and the implications is paramount in risk reduction analyses, 
because this factor can influence the success of flood adaptation measures.  The existence of 
losers might imply the development of an undesired response, disengagement with emergency 
planning or conflicts between different societal groups (Penning-Rowsell & Pardoe, 2012).  A 
contribution to flood mitigation proportional to the benefits reaped might be the solution for BA 
(Benn, 2009).  
 Cost–benefit analysis can be a useful tool to determine the practicality of flood 
mitigation.  In 2016, the World Bank presented a cost–benefit analysis of implementing various 
measures in BA, such as improvements to the drainage system, the addition of retention ponds 
and educational programmes in the Maldonado and Vega Basins, where floods are frequent.  The 
outcomes of this analysis showed that the benefits are double the total costs (World Bank, 2016).  
The group that would benefit the most would be those living or renting properties (approximately 
90% of beneficiaries) in flood-prone areas, followed by those using the road network running 
through the floodplain.  If cost–benefit ratios are estimated properly, then flood protection costs 
can be distributed between a larger number of stakeholders, including the local community, the 





al., 2014).  However, cost–benefit analysis should not drive decision-making of itself, because it 
is sometimes based on incorrect assumptions and imprecise data, which can lead to inaccurate 
results and consequently, locally unsuitable decisions and regulations.  
 The flood mitigation strategies that have been implemented in BA so far include 
structural and non-structural measures, and a more integrated flood management system, 
including prevention, mitigation and response features.  Structural protection measures have 
included increasing the drainage system capacity and installing retention ponds.  Non-structural 
measures have comprised updating of the urban and emergency legal framework, the country’s 
climate change action plan and new institutional arrangements (e.g., the formation of the 
Committee for Emergency Attention and the Flood Risk Management Council).  Improvement 
measures thus far have also included the formation of international partnerships (e.g. the C40 
Cities Climate Leadership Group and the Union of Ibero-American Capital Cities).  Also, a 
hydrometeorological alert system “SIHVIGILA”, relocation of vulnerable communities living by 
the Riachuelo River and response training for vulnerable groups and public agencies (GCABA, 
2015a), has been implemented in BA.  
 Other measures that should be investigated by BA authorities are amphibious (floatable) 
constructions, temporary flood protection measures and the formation of evacuation routes along 
elevated topographical land features. The advantages and disadvantages of each measure are 
described in Appendix A.  Some of these measures can be time consuming, like updating the 
legal framework, or they may require training or specific professional skills and big investments, 
as for the construction of reliable flood protection.    
 A dynamic adaptive policy pathway can be a useful tool to implement flood mitigation 





uncertainties, and it allows flexibility over time when modifying flood adaptation plans.  This 
approach has been used successfully to implement the Thames Estuary 2100 project in the UK, 
the Rhine-Meuse delta project in the Netherlands and flood protection measures in New York 
City (Haasnoot, Kwakkel, Walker, & ter Maat, 2013) (Figure 22).  This methodology caters for 
uncertainties created by a lack of information and is especially relevant to planners in developing 
countries, such as Argentina (Reeder & Ranger, 2011).  It helps authorities determine for how 
long a decision can be postponed based on, for example, sea level rise scenarios, and it helps 
planners identify the triggers, like inundation levels, that predicate different actions in a flood 
adaptation plan.   
In Figure 22, starting from the current situation (vertical gray line), flood damage 
reduction targets begin to be missed after a short period of time. Action A (red line) and B (light-
blue line) should be able to achieve basic protection in coming decades. For instance, low-
cost/low-regret actions (A), such as sandbagging, will not be enough to cope with floods in the 
2030 scenario generated here, where the maximum flood depth will be 6 m.  Then, a tipping 
point is reached within coming decades; a shift to actions C (green line) or D (yellow line) will 
be required to achieve the targets. Action D, relocation of buildings, will achieve the targets. 
Importantly, the dynamic adaptive policy pathway provides more equity to stakeholders because 







Figure 22.  A dynamic adaptive policy pathway (Haasnoot et al., 2013) adapted for BA flood mitigation. 
 
Public flood mitigation schemes are not able to eliminate flood risk completely, and they 
comprise long-term investments.  Consequently, they are not appealing to governments who 
work in a 4-year election cycle.  This is why private or individual mitigation measures are 
important to complement public mitigation schemes.  The use of water barriers, water-resistant 
constructions materials, flood-adapted buildings and flood insurances are clear examples of 
individual flood mitigation measures that could work for BA residents and businesses.    
 
Research Limitations and Potential Improvements 
 In this section, the assumptions behind this research are presented, as are limitations to 
the methods used, along with potential improvements that can be incorporated in future research.  
A summary of limitations and improvements is illustrated in Table 9.  Also indicated are 






Table 9  
Research Limitations and Improvements 
Assumptions and limitations 
Implications for 
model Potential improvements 
(-) (+) (+/-) 
Flood model and georeferenced data 
Inundation model assumes static 
coastal–estuarine morphology 
      Include model of coastal dynamics 
Flood model has low resolution 
(73 × 73 m cells), broad flood 
depth increments (1 m), non-
updated baseline, and only 
accounts for river flooding 
      
Use a high-resolution digital elevation model (DEM).  Update baseline (1990) to the 2000 decade.  
Integrate surface flooding and conditions preceding and following a flood event (e.g., saturated soils 
due to previous precipitation), and future changes in flood risk (e.g., changes in drainage system) 
(Remo et al., 2016) 
Georeferenced data projected on 
different systems had to be 
converted to Posiciones 
Geodesicas Argentinas 
(POSGAR) 2007. 
      
National and local institutions should establish a unique coordinate system so as to create a unique 







Use of generic depth–damage 
curves developed in the US 
(HAZUS method) and Germany 
(MERK method) limits accuracy 
in local BA scenarios 
      
Develop depth–damage and restoration curves with local experts and site-specific data for BA, 
considering construction materials, local standards, types of building (e.g., detached, semi-detached 
house or apartment) 
Extend the study area to better understand indirect effects outside the city 
Other hazards are not considered 
(e.g., surface flooding, flood 
duration, velocity and debris 
impacts, the rise of the 
groundwater table) 
   Evaluate increased vulnerability due to other hazards or cascading effects 
Local statistics are sometimes 
not comprehensive, and there are 
low volumes of local 
literature/observations of flood 
damage to validate BA flood 
impacts 
      
Update DesInventar (the disaster information management system) database with official and detailed 
data 
Develop post event field surveys with a standardised method to allow future quantitative analysis, 
development and calibration of depth–damage curves for BA 
Include questions about experiences in flood events or any type of hazard in the National Census so as 






Building damage         
Unpublished, undetailed or 
outdated census (2010) and 
building data (with no 
specifications about building 
type, age, construction material, 
storey, floor area or  height) were 
used 
      
Update building inventories and socioeconomic data when more information becomes available after 
the 2020 census is conducted 
Damage to residential housing 
assessments were developed at 
the meshblock level, the smallest 
geographic unit for which 
statistical data is collected and 
processed during a Census.  
      
Develop a land-use database with building and contents values at the tax-lot level, the smallest 
geographic unit for which properties statistical data can be collected, similar to HAZUS (FEMA, 2017) 
and HOWAS (Geo Research Center [GFZ], 2015) that contain national data for buildings, facilities, 
lifelines and hazard data in the US and Germany, respectively.  
Industrial and commercial 
damage estimates only consider 
buildings that have been 
surveyed and georeferenced by 
the local BA council 
      
Contents values are taken as a 
percentage of building structure 
values 






Public infrastructure damage and 
building damage reduction 
equations were developed for 
other countries, where conditions 
are dissimilar 
      
Calibrate with empirical data from BA.  The influences of existing flood mitigation measures and 
responses to warnings on damage reduction should be further investigated 
Industrial and commercial 
damage figures only consider 
building and contents damage, 
not downtime 
   Include financial losses due to functional downtime  
Lifelines & Utilities         
Damage to lifelines and utilities 
do not take all infrastructural 
assets into account (e.g., gas, 
water and wastewater systems) 
      
Create partnerships with service companies to create inventories for more infrastructure assets (e.g., 
gas, water and wastewater systems) and update utility georeferenced databases 
Utilities’ service areas are not 
specified 
      
Statistics describing numbers of users and georeferenced data describing utility service areas would 






Lifelines and utility damage 
assessments do not consider the 
variable vulnerability of the 
systems’ components, network 
interdependency and cascading 
damage 
      
An evaluation of potentially affected areas should be done with service companies and local experts, as 
they could provide information on the system's vulnerability and performance during floods, mitigation 
measures and any improvements that might be in progress 
Utility disruption (to hospitals, 
health centres, schools, 
telecommunications towers and 
substations) was only measured 
in terms of affected people 
      
Consider infrastructure damage and losses based on average daily expenditure per student/patient/client 
and functional downtime. 
Transport disruption         
Economic effects caused by 
transport disruption were only 
measured in terms of ticket value 
loss 
      Include infrastructure losses and increases in travel time 
Indirect effects on areas outside 
the flood-prone area were not 
considered 
      
Areas outside the flood-prone area can experience indirect flood impacts since transport in and out of 
the city can be affected when road access and transport services are limited during floods, which should 






Vehicle damage         
Vehicle damage assumes an even 
inundation (0.3 and 0.6 m), and 
that vehicles will be in the 
inundated area all at the same 
time 
      Increase historical flood depth accuracy and traffic data 
Clean-up costs         
Road clean-up costs were 
developed with average road 
width in mind 
      Develop a detailed road network with actual road widths included 
Building clean-up costs do not 
consider property size or type of 
flood water (e.g., clean/grey, 
flood/storm, flood waters 
including sewage and 
contaminated waters) 
      
Consider property floor areas, types of flood water (e.g., clean/grey, flood/storm, flood waters 
including sewage and contaminated waters) 
Post flood clean-up costs should be recorded in future flood events to calibrate calculations 
Flood loss index 
Use of weighting factors was not 
100% representative 
      
The flood loss index should be used as a primary analysis tool to identify exposed areas 
Further analysis should be done, preferably at the tax-lot level, the smallest geographic unit for which 








Emergency response cost 
equations were developed for 
other countries 
      Emergency costs should be recorded in future flood events to calibrate calculations 
 






 Flood impacts operate on different time scales, with short- to long-term effects, and are 
not limited to within the BA city boundaries.  Estimates of population numbers affected by 
damage to infrastructure lifelines and utilities should be considered to facilitate the supply of 
alternative power sources or telecommunications networks, and also when evacuation modelling, 
because services disruptions can predicate evacuation even when households are not flooded.  In 
addition, evaluating the impacts on hospitals, health centres and schools can help emergency 
managers to identify which other facilities will need more resources to cope with increasing 
demand and to inform people of where the closest unaffected facilities are.  
 Flood effects on vehicles on the road during non-working hours in a 0.6 m flood 
represent the worst-case scenario in BA, as according to our research, USD 266 million loss is 
expected.  Warnings play an important role in avoiding vehicle-related fatalities (e.g. 
electrocution or drowning) and lost value for vehicles, as people might be able to move their 
vehicles to safe areas before inundation occurs.  
 In BA, models presented here show that significant building damage is caused in 
relatively minor floods (e.g. the 2- and 5-year events).  There will be a considerable increase in 
losses as the severity of flooding increases in future scenarios (e.g. the years 2030 and 2070).  
Mapping showed that flood damage in BA should be relatively evenly distributed throughout the 
flood-prone area and probably will not be concentrated in any single neighbourhood, except for 
industrial damage, which would probably be greater in the south of BA.  According to the results 
of this research, the highest damage costs throughout the flood-prone area were sustained by the 
commercial sector.  A small group of census blocks suffered higher residential building damage 





density.  Naturally, our calculations of losses increased when emergency, clean-up and repair 
costs are added.  
 Flood loss figures derived from the FLI indicated that Parque Avellaneda, Flores, San 
Telmo, Villa Lugano and Recoleta should be the most affected neighbourhoods in terms of 
building damage and exposed area.  However, losses measured in absolute values shows that loss 
would most likely be concentrated in the Belgrano, Villa Soldati, Palermo, Barracas and Nueva 
Pompeya districts.  Special attention is therefore needed for the interpretation of results and to 
make results practicable for use by BA emergency response management.  
 Moreover, the city centre is located in the flood-prone area, which will impact on the 
administrative, commercial and cultural activities.  Decentralisation of key assets outside the 
flood-prone area could reduce vulnerability and the time people are left without access to 
services.  Even though flood disruption of certain activities and sectors probably cannot be 
avoided, the level of disruption and recovery time can be diminished.  Restricting construction 
and prioritising low-damage land use (e.g. parks, playgrounds and carparks) in high flood risk 
areas can also improve the city’s resilience to floods.  
 Uncertainty remains in these results because documented impacts from previous floods 
are not always publicly available, and local BA statistics are not comprehensive.  Nevertheless, 
the work presented herein demonstrates the feasibility of using disparate datasets, combined with 
reasonable assumptions and established modelling approaches, to provide preliminary damage 
assessment estimates, to identify critical flood prone areas and to implement potential 
improvements to emergency response plans.  
 The results of the current impact assessment can be used as a baseline to assist the BA 





coordination of preventive and response activities, with focus on the areas identified as highly 
exposed.  Furthermore, the findings of this research substantially enlarge the area that BA 
planners need to focus their mitigation efforts on, as only areas that are prone to waterlogging 
have been identified so far, and the flood-prone area demarcated in this study is far larger.  As 
described by Stephens (2015), planning efforts addressing sea level rises and floods should be 
spent on increasing adaptability within short periods of times instead of concentrating only on 
the magnitude of the event.  In other words, enhancing resilience should be a priority regardless 







Evacuation and Emergency Response 
 
Introduction 
 Frequent flooding has been affecting BA since the early stages of urbanisation (Novick, 
Collado, & Favelukes, n.d.).  Approximately 8.41% of BA’s population resides in low-lying 
areas exposed to floods.  City authorities can choose to do nothing, avoid, reduce, transfer or 
mitigate flood risks.  Emergency responses and efforts to mitigate flood impacts potentially 
available to BA authorities include administering medical treatment, effecting rescue or ordering 
an evacuation (Department of Homeland Security, n.d.).  Evacuation can reduce casualties if 
people know evacuation routes, safe areas and are proactive about arriving at these areas before a 
hazardous event (Knook et al., 2015).  Research has shown that different percentages of 
populations evacuate to different locations during emergencies.  For instance, in the U.K., 42% 
prefer to go to evacuation centres, 38% to friends and family, 9% to hotels and 11% to other 
types of accommodation (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013), whereas in the U.S. State of California, 
only 12% look for accommodation at evacuation centres, 48% house of a friend or relative, 14% 
prefer hotels, 15% other, and 11% do not know (Alabdouli, 2015). 
 Diverse types of evacuation can be carried out, small or large scale, pre- or post-event, 
immediate or pre-warned.  Pre-warned evacuation can be either voluntarily, or mandatory.  
Voluntary evacuation is triggered when there is a considerable actual or perceived risk, and 
people move without being told to do so (New Zealand Civil Defence, 2008).  This type of 
evacuation can benefit or hinder emergency management, as there may be too few people left in 
flood-effected areas to assist, or more people may put themselves in danger if they evacuate at 





A mandatory evacuation is issued when risks are considered to be significant by authorities, and 
is only advisable when the risk of remaining is greater.  
 Emergency managers need to organise the evacuation process efficiently, and via 
designated routes, to guarantee people’s safety.  Effective official communication can reduce 
anxiety and the effects of dangerous behaviours, and can increase the chances that people will 
follow instructions during evacuation (New Zealand Civil Defence, 2008).  Evacuation can be 
divided into the following phases, which require different resources and staff (New Zealand Civil 
Defence, 2008):  
 the decision to suggest evacuation versus “shelter-in-place”, 
 issuance of a warning and required actions, 
 oversight of the evacuation, 
 oversight of shelters, and  
 organisation of the return-to-home process. 
 Evacuation modelling can optimise real evacuation times and clearance.  The complexity 
of modelling evacuees and potential routes lies in the interaction of different disciplines, such as 
transport planning, engineering and the social sciences.  Environmental, social and infrastructural 
factors such as land slope, weather, time of day, planned social events, road conditions and travel 
modes affect evacuation.  Demographic variables and evacuees’ physical and psychological 
conditions, behaviour (Buckland & Rahman, 1999; Drabek, 2000; Handmer, 2000), risk 
perception and behavioural response to official warnings can also affect evacuation, but these 
factors are often too complex to model (Lindell & Prater, 2007).   
 Over the years, several evacuation models have been implemented for various hazards.  





models explore interactions between, and decision-making processes of, individuals and 
organisational agents in a system, based on their roles and empirical, or theoretical, 
characteristics (D’Orazio et al., 2014; Medina et al., 2016; Yin et al., 2014).  The discipline 
demands a good working knowledge of population behaviour, which is site-specific, or if such 
knowledge is not available, the development of surveys to gather information to be used as input 
into the model.  The LCPD ignores social variables.  It includes only environmental factors, such 
as vegetative land cover and topography, to estimate the minimum cost of travel to evacuation 
sites, which is derived from route length, time spent evacuating and energy (e.g. fuel).  The 
LCPD approach is suitable for both vehicle and pedestrian evacuation models.  It has been 
implemented, for example, for tsunami evacuation of Sumner Beach, New Zealand (Le, 2016) 
and in the U.S. State of Washington (Wood et al., 2016). 
 Commonly available GIS-based approaches are ideal for evacuation modelling.  The 
network analyst tool in ArcGIS is a network-based spatial analysis tool that allows researchers to 
model routes based on the shortest path approach.  The network analyst tool also facilitates 
modelling of “barriers” that restrict or alter traffic flow, such as traffic lights, railroad crossings 
and flooded areas.  Another GIS-based evacuation approach that has recently been developed is 
the capacity-aware shortest path evacuation routing (CASPER) tool, which is based on the same 
concept as LCPD and incorporates variables directly related to transport.  The CASPER 
evacuation model has been used successfully for tsunami evacuations in the U.S. State of 
California (Alabdouli, 2015) and in Tauranga, New Zealand (Knook et al., 2015).  In California, 
private vehicle evacuation was modelled by considering variables like number of vehicles and 
shadow evacuation zones, initial delay costs, saturation density of a road with one unit of 





analysed by zone, from high-hazard zones (fatality likely) to areas of low hazard (fatality 
unlikely), followed by an analysis of points of safety (safe zones) (Knook et al., 2015).  
 In summary, evacuation models are a good decision support tool during planning and 
emergency response phases because they allow authorities to estimate travel times, and they 
inform decisions about how best to accommodate evacuees at evacuation centres based on 
available resources, equipment and facilities.  Therefore, in Chapter 3, evacuation routes for both 
vehicles and pedestrians caught in different flood scenarios in BA will be modelled.  The aim is 
to inform flood emergency management in BA, because no models have yet been published for 
the city.  The capacity of emergency facilities to serve the BA population based on evacuation 
service areas will be also investigated in Chapter 3.   
 
Evacuation Planning in BA 
 The city of BA has been subject to evacuations in the past, and there is a clear need for 
evacuation modelling.  The last flood event in BA resulted in the displacement of more than 550 
people in February 2005 ("The April storm," 2013).  In October 2012, 20 families were 
evacuated from slum numbers 21 and 24 ("Storm in the city," 2012), and in April 2013, 300 
people were evacuated, with an additional 350,000 people affected in the neighbourhoods of 
Saavedra, Belgrano, Núñez and Palermo ("Almost 50 deaths," 2013).  Following these severe 
events, the city council started work on improving the urban and emergency planning legal 
framework, institutional arrangements and warning systems.  
 The urban planning framework developed for BA during the 20th Century has been 
characterised by a non-integrated approach of environmental and socioeconomic components 





inconsistencies in the classification of permitted and prohibited activities throughout time, like 
construction in flood-prone areas.  This non-integrated urban planning approach has contributed 
to an increase in the city’s vulnerability to floods (Koutsovitis & Goyeneche, n. d.; Clichevsky & 
Herzer, 2000). 
 Improvements have been made with the introduction of the Urban and Environmental 
Plan (Ministry of Planning and Public Works [MPyOP], 2006), the Strategic Plan (GCABA, 
2015b), and the Action Plan in Face of Climate Change 2020 (GCABA, 2015a), which adopt a 
more integrated management approach to biophysical and socioeconomic aspects of flood 
emergency planning, and facilitate cooperation between the city council and other municipalities.  
These three plans propose general measures to adapt and to mitigate natural hazards and climate 
change.  In addition, new urban (MDUyT, 2017a) and building codes (MDUyT, 2017b) are 
being developed via a consultation process and with the input of public opinions.  Furthermore, 
Argentina is currently developing a national plan for disaster risk resilience (DRR), based on the 
Argentina: Sendai Framework Data Readiness Review Report (UNISDR, 2017), and at the city 
level, an emergency management plan (known as the Plan Director de Emergencias) (GCABA, 
2009) has been prepared that establishes responsibilities for each local governmental agency in 
the occurrence of an emergency.   
 The revised legal framework and new institutional arrangements described by these 
documents have evolved over time.  Authorities have now acquired diverse tools to reduce flood 
vulnerability.  However, the efficiency of new systems and tools is still questionable, and more 
work needs to be done to develop comprehensive evacuation strategies and modelling.  This gap 
is readily apparent, as no published literature describing evacuation models for BA exists. 









 Spatiotemporal exposure to floods.  To address the BA flood modelling gap, first  the 
extent of the flood-exposed population in BA was estimated in different flood scenarios (1990, 
2030, 2070) by intersecting the Lecertua (2010) BA flood model with census centroids 
representing 2010 Census meshblocks containing numbers of households and people.  
Demographic characteristics such as age, gender, deprived households and income levels were 
also considered, because they are crucial factors that influence social vulnerability.  
 
 Evacuation analysis.  Estimates of households potentially requiring evacuation were 
based on flood depth and evacuation probability, and were calculated by intersecting the 
Lecertua (2010) BA flood model with census centroids containing data describing number of 
households and people living in flood-prone areas.  Penning-Rowsell et al.’s (2013) minimum 
and maximum evacuation probabilities (23% for a 0–1 m flood and 87% for a >1 m flood) were 
used to create a BA flood model describing flood scenarios, where waters increased by 1 m 
increments.   
 
 Evacuation routes.  In this research, diverse evacuation scenarios were also analysed.  
The Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) online road network data (ArcGIS, 2012) 
and the closest facility online tool were used, which are included in the ArcGIS 10.3 network 









Figure 23.  Evacuation scenarios for BA. In scenario A, people evacuate by private vehicle from the flood-prone 
areas to evacuation centres and in scenario B, people walk to bus stops in safe areas for subsequent evacuation to 
accommodation outside hazard zones.   
 
 In scenario A in Figure 23, people evacuate by private vehicle from census centroids in 
the flood-prone areas to evacuation centres.  In scenario B, people walk to bus stops in safe areas 
for subsequent evacuation to accommodation outside hazard zones.  This use of multiple 
transportation options is important in BA, as many people do not have private cars and depend 
on public transport, particularly buses, which are the preferred means of transport in the city 
(Secretaría de Transporte, 2007).  In this model, it is assumed that buses (capacity = 33 
passengers each) would be provided by Buenos Aires Civil Defence, because this agency is 
responsible for transporting evacuees, as established by the BA Emergency Management Plan 
(GCABA, 2009).  
 The following assumptions were also made for the evacuation model:  
 In the year 2070-10 year return flood scenario, an inundation of higher than 1 m was 
assumed to cause maximum evacuation (87% of total households), and the minimum 
evacuation probability (23% of total households) was assumed to be the result of < 1 
m floods (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013) (Table 10). 
Evacuation centre Flooded area 





 Also assumed is that early in the morning and at night, all populations living in the 
flood-prone area would be at home, but that different percentages of households 
would receive flood warnings depending on time of day.  Further, it is assumed that 
25% of households would respond to evacuation warnings at night, as the remainder 
would be asleep.  Assumptions are based on the approach taken by Bewsher 
Consulting Pty Ltd (2009), where they assumed 25% and 90% of vehicles wold be on 
the road during working and non-working hours, respectively.  
 For the purposes of creating a workable model, all populations living in the flood-
prone areas were assumed to be at home both on weekends and during weekdays.  
Travel time variations between weekdays and weekends were based on ESRI’s traffic 
database (ArcGIS, 2012). 
 Statistics describing tourists arriving at Jorge Newbery Airport, BA were accessed to 
estimate seasonal increases in evacuee numbers in summer versus winter (GCABA, 
n.d.).  Similar to non-tourists, 42% of tourists were assumed be evacuated to 
evacuation centres in Parque Pereyra, Martin Fierro and Colegiales, which are located 
close to neighbourhoods tourists commonly frequent.  Tourists arriving by vehicle, 






Table 10  
Evacuation probability, households in receipt of warnings and evacuation destinations  
Evacuated 
households in 
>1 m flood 
Evacuated 
households in 
>1 m flood 
Households in 
receipt of warnings 
during the day  
Households in 
receipt of warnings 
during the night 
Households/tourists in 
receipt of warnings 
who make it to 
evacuation centres 
23% 87% 90% 25% 42% 
Note. Evacuation data sourced from Penning-Rowsell et al. (2013) and percentage of households in receipt of 
warning was based on the approach taken by Bewsher Consulting Pty Ltd (2009).  
 
 Vehicle evacuation modelling included the entire BA road network.  A restriction was 
set to avoid pedestrian streets because their width tends to be inadequate for vehicles, 
and therefore, they are used only for pedestrian evacuations.  Vehicle speeds were set 
according to the speed limit of each road class.  Nonetheless, in case of an 
emergency, drivers might exceed the speed limit due to panic, or be forced to reduce 
speed because of congestion.  
 For pedestrian evacuation models, pedestrian-only streets were included and 
highways were excluded.  Previously published research was used to set minimum 
(0.88 m/s), average (1.43 m/s) and maximum (2.8 m/s) walking speeds (Fraser, 2014). 
 Departure time, defined as the time needed by evacuees to start movement towards a 
place of safety (Cuesta, Abreu, & Alvear, 2015), was set at 5 minutes to account for 
obstacles and impediments like stairs, elevators and disabilities, which can delay 
departure time. 
 Models included evacuation centres located outside the flood-prone area, in Parque 





Colegiales.  These centres’ capacities were modelled based on information obtained 
from risk operational management in BA Civil Defence (G. Barbaresi, Civil Defence, 
personal communication, September 8th, 2017).  
 All evacuees were assumed to choose the same means of transport (i.e. bus or private 
vehicle) to evacuate. 
 The number of people who evacuated to designated centres was based on figures 
obtained from U.K. research (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013).  The larger study area 
modelled in the U.K. research was better matched to the size of the BA flood-prone 
areas.  Similar research in the U.S. considered only Orange County, a single county in 
California (Alabdouli, 2015).  Furthermore, Penning-Rowsell et al. (2013) used a 
greater percentage (42%) of people evacuated to designated evacuation centres, 
which might be more appropriate for developing cities as BA, where less people 
might be able to afford private accommodation. 
 
 Post evacuation dynamics.  The number of evacuees, and costs to evacuated households 
remaining in temporary accommodation after evacuation, were based on the percentage of 
households initially evacuating to shelters (42%) and hotels (9%) (Penning-Rowsell et al. 2013).  
Models also took into account the average price for a room in a one- or two-star, three-star hotel 
and aparthotel in BA in 2017, which was USD 32, USD 40, and USD 55 respectively (GCABA, 
n.d.).  
 
 Emergency response dynamics.  Interviews were conducted with local authorities and 





emergency response, and to identify opportunities for improvement.  Participants were selected 
from the council’s website staff list, dependent on their roles in emergency response.  Interviews 
were developed under the specifications of the Human Ethics Committee of the University of 
Canterbury, New Zealand, and included questions about flood control infrastructure, urban 
planning, future projects to reduce flood vulnerability, risk management software, agreements 
between local agencies and other institutions, the strengths and limitations of BA emergency 
plans, climate change, sea level rises, flood models, the welfare of evacuees and communication 
methods used during emergencies (Appendix B).   
 
 Emergency response service areas.  In BA, administrative boundaries, based on groups 
of neighbourhoods, are used to set up fire station service areas (Figure 24), the part of the city in 
which fire brigades provide service.  However, it is uncertain that administrative boundaries are 
the most efficient way to set up service areas to respond to emergencies, because different 
administrative areas might contain diverse populations, with a huge variance in population 
density, which means that fire stations may in fact be overwhelmed by an excessive workload, 
and may have to re-assign resources accordingly.  Travel distance from fire stations was 
considered a better way to establish service areas and as a way to improve emergency response 
capacity. Existing staging points, sites where fire brigades and Civil Defence are located in case 
of meteorological warnings to offer a faster response, were also considered.  
 Based on travel distance, an analysis of fire stations and staging points service areas was 
performed using the service area tool in ArcGIS 10.3, which encompasses all streets within a 
specified distance from a particular station or staging point.  The existing BA road network 





identified by the local council (GCABA, n.d.) and Lecertua (2010), and 14 existing staging 
points to determine the potential service area of each facility in scenarios with and without 
floods.  The tools and road network data we used in this analysis were computer-based, instead 
of online, because machine-based tools allowed us to upload more “polygons barriers” (e.g. 
flooded areas) and to more freely simulate how floods would affect emergency response 
capacity. 
 





Fire stations and staging points service areas were delimited based on distance (2, 5 or 8 
km) from fire stations.  Populations living within the service areas were calculated by 
intersecting census centroids with service area polygons.  
 Also considered was travel distance from fire stations and staging points in the 2070 
flood scenario. Polygon barriers in ArcGIS simulating river flooding and waterlogged areas were 
added to the analysis to better reflect reality or delays in emergency response.  The costs, 
reflecting the difficulty in traversing flooded areas, were apportioned by applying different 
multiplication factors (2, 5 and 10) in travel distance. 
 
Results  
 Spatiotemporal exposure.  Flood modelling results indicated that the population living 
in the flood-prone areas near the La Plata River (243,200 people) represented 8.41% of the total 
BA population, reported in the 2010 census (INDEC, 2010), in the worst-case flood scenario (in 
the year 2070).  This population was 51% females, and 65% were elderly people aged between 
15 and 64 years (GCABA, n.d.).  According to the scenarios generated, Villa Soldati, Palermo, 
Barracas, La Boca and Retiro’s populations were the most vulnerable to floods, because these 
neighbourhoods have high population density, and more than 45% of their land areas would be 
exposed to flooding in the 2070 flood scenario.   
 Approximately 82,300 households (7 % of total households in BA) might experience 
flooding.  A large proportion of flood-vulnerable households (15%) are characterised as deprived 
households; they are mainly distributed in the south of the city and in Retiro in the east (Figure 
25) (GCABA, n.d.).  Deprived households, where resources are scarce, will encounter more 





aid will be required in these areas.  The south of BA is also characterised by high population 
density, illiteracy, unemployment and low income levels, a full 30% lower than in the north, as 
measured by average total family income (GCABA, n.d.-a).  Income level can be an indicator of 
household location, type of structure (either water-resistant or not), number of vehicles per 
household (Page & Adams, 2003) and high dependence on council aid (Kim, 2012).  
 
Figure 25.  Demographic variables in BA (GCABA, n.d.).  a) shows population per census meshblock, b) the 
number of deprived houses per meshblock, c) the percent of people over 65 years old and d) the land price of each 






 Minimum and maximum values of percent evacuated households were modelled for the 
1990, 2030 and 2070 floods, and all return periods (2, 5, 10 years) (Table 11).  Minimum and 
maximum values of percent evacuated households occur in the 1990-2 year return and 2070-10 
year return flood, which represent 1.39% and 3.55 % of total residencies in BA, respectively.  
Evacuation probability increased with inundation recurrence as flood waters rose.  To take the 
1990 baseline scenario and its return periods an example, evacuated households increased by 
8.3% between the 2- and 5-year return floods, and they increased again by 10.4% between the 2- 
and 10-year return events in the baseline scenario (1990).  Results showed that the most affected 
neighbourhoods were Villa Soldati, Palermo, Barracas, La Boca and Retiro, because of their 
large land area exposed to flooding.  According to results from this research, such a large land 
exposure will trigger the evacuation of 20,000 households in the least severe flood scenario (the 
1990 version).  These values could be even higher if additional population displacement occurs 
when households that are not flooded decide to evacuate as service and utility lifelines to their 
homes are disrupted.  Results reported here may overestimate numbers of evacuees, based on 
published reports of actual evacuee numbers in previous events ("Storm in Buenos Aires," 2012; 






Table 11  
Percentage of evacuated households in different flood scenarios, BA 
  Flood scenario  




Return period  
(years) 
Return period  
(years) 
Return period  
(years) 
2 5 10 2 5 10 2 5 10 
Barracas 31,249 10 10 10 10 13 16 13 16 19 
Belgrano 54,915 2 2 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 
La Boca 16,287 16 16 16 16 24 31 24 37 41 
Flores 60,248 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Núñez 22,700 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Nueva Pompeya 14,460 6 6 6 6 8 9 8 9 13 
Palermo 102,918 4 4 4 4 5 8 5 8 9 
Puerto Madero 2,465 19 19 19 25 38 38 38 39 56 
Recoleta 73,156 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18 
Retiro 24,147 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 23 
San Telmo 9,188 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Villa Lugano 39,848 4 4 4 4 7 7 7 8 8 
Villa Riachuelo 4,782 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Villa Soldati 13,574 27 38 38 57 72 84 76 86 87 





 Evacuation analysis.  The analysis assume 42% of evacuated household go to 
evacuation centres, while a minor proportion may remove themselves to hotels (9%).  The results 
showed that evacuation centres should be prepared to provide accommodation, food and support 
to at least 8,335 households in the baseline scenario (the 1990 model), and to 21,295 displaced 
households, understood as one family, in the 2070 scenario (Table 12).  In both scenarios, the 
number of households opting for hotels was lower, accounting for just 1,786 and 4,563 
households, respectively (Table 13).   
 
Table 12  
Households accommodated by evacuation centres in flood scenarios, BA  












2 19,846 8,335 7,085 4,168 2,917 834 
5 21,491 9,026 7,672 4,513 3,159 903 
10 21,914 9,204 7,823 4,602 3,221 920 
2030 
2 25,128 10,554 8,971 5,277 3,694 1,055 
5 34,286 14,400 12,240 7,200 5,040 1,440 
10 41,307 17,349 14,747 8,674 6,072 1,735 
2070 
2  35,214 14,790 12,571 7,395 5,176 1,479 
5  42,998 18,059 15,350 9,030 6,321 1,806 
10  50,703 21,295 18,101 10,648 7,453 2,130 
Note.  42% of total evacuated households are assumed to stay in evacuation centres. In the first week following 
evacuation, 100% of these evacuated households remain in evacuation centres, 85% remain in the second week, 
50% in the third week, 35% in the fourth and 10% remain in the eighth week.  Analysis adapted from Penning-





Table 13  




















2 19,846 1,786 1,518 893 625 179 
5 21,491 1,934 1,644 967 677 193 
10 21,914 1,972 1,676 986 690 197 
2030 
2 25,128 2,262 1,922 1,131 792 226 
5 34,286 3,086 2,623 1,543 1,080 309 
10 41,307 3,718 3,160 1,859 1,301 372 
2070 
2  35,214 3,169 2,694 1,585 1,109 317 
5  42,998 3,870 3,289 1,935 1,354 387 
10  50,703 4,563 3,879 2,282 1,597 456 
Note.  *9% of the total population is assumed to occupy hotels as alternative accommodation.  In the first week 
following evacuation, 100% of these evacuated households remain in hotels, 85% in the second week, 50% in the 
third, 35% in the fourth and 10% in the eighth week.  Analysis adapted from Penning-Rowsell et al. (2013). 
 
 Vehicle evacuation.  The evacuation analysis preferentially assigned populations to 
routes with the destinations of Dorrego, Avellaneda, Martin Fierro, Colegiales, Parque Pereyra 
and Chacabuco, due to the proximity of these evacuation centres to flood-prone areas (Figure 
24).  Costa Rica and Pomar were excluded as they are too far away from flood-affected areas.  
Avellaneda and Parque Pereyra in the south would potentially receive the highest number of 
evacuees (Figure 26).  It should be noted that the number of evacuees arriving at evacuation 
centres differed per scenario because the ArcGIS (2012) network analyst tool automatically finds 





 Travel time by vehicle from flood-prone areas to evacuation centres tended to be greater 
during the night than in the morning, regardless of the day of the week, because more cars tend 
to be on the road during non-working hours (Figure 27).  For instance, it was calculated that the 
average difference between travel time in the morning and night was 0.66 minutes on weekdays 
and 0.08 minutes on weekends.  During weekends, an average reduction in travel time of 1.4 
minutes was realised.  Evacuation times calculated with ArcGIS were within the range of travel 
times indicated by Google Maps.  Travel times indicated by Google Maps, in agreement with 
ArcGIS, differed only marginally in the day versus at night, and weekday versus weekend, by 







Figure 26. Evacuation routes for vehicles and pedestrians departing from BA census centroids in the flood-prone 
areas and arriving at evacuation centres, and safe zone bus stops, respectively. 
 
 The analysis also showed that the longest vehicle evacuation times would be from the 
Colegiales, La Boca and Puerto Madero neighbourhoods to the Colegiales (27 min) and Martin 
Fierro (37 min) evacuation centres, respectively.  The average time required by most vehicles to 
travel from their households to the evacuation centres would be between 16 and 17 minutes 





 It must be noted that additional travel time may be required for night scenarios because 
visibility is reduced at night, and people who are asleep might take a longer time to become 
aware of inundation hazards and to decide to evacuate.  Also, travel times during evacuations at 
night can be greater because congestion might be more severe than in daytime scenarios.  
Traversing inundated areas with reduced visibility might add not only travel time, but also total 
distance as detours might be necessary.  Traffic congestion in non-flood scenarios represents, on 
average, 42% extra travel time ("TomTom Traffic Index”, 2016), especially during rush hour, 
which in BA is from 7–8 a.m. in the morning, and 6–7 p.m. in the evening (Secretaría de 
Transporte, 2007), so special attention should be given by authorities to evacuation planning 
















Evacuation route travel times from census centroids in flood-prone areas to evacuation centres in BA  
 
 

































1 Dorrego 15.1 9–18 15.8 10–18 14.3 9–16 14.5 9–16 
11 Avellaneda 7.2 5–9 7.2 5–10 6.4 5–9 6.6 5–8 
102 
Martin 
Fierro 11.9 10–18 12.8 10–18 10.7 10–16 10.6 10–14 
185 Colegiales 16.8 16–35 17.9 18–40 16.2 18–40 16.9 16–35 








Figure 28.  Cumulative number of evacuees and evacuation times of people arriving at evacuation centres in BA by 
vehicle. 
 
 Pedestrian evacuation.  Pedestrian evacuation necessarily takes longer than vehicle 
evacuation; maximum travel time by foot to the nearest centre proved to be 1 hour at average 
walking speed (1.43 m/s, Fraser, 2014), while by vehicle, maximum travel time was only 37 
minutes.  Our calculations revealed that evacuation time increased on average by 12, 21 and 33 
minutes when considering maximum (2.8 m/s), average (1.43 m/s) and minimum (0.88 m/s) 
walking speeds. Thus, in the models generated for this research, the amount of time taken by 
pedestrians to evacuate flood-prone areas would be 51, 34 and 25 minutes with minimum, 
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speed were in the vicinity of Recoleta, in the east, towards bus stop number 2 (59 minutes), and 
in the vicinity of Nueva Pompeya, in the south, towards bus stop number 9 (50 minutes). These 
results are independently of the day, time or season. However, low visibility during night time or 
extreme weather conditions can potentially affect walking speed.  
 In Figures 27 and 29, the peaks in the graphs of both vehicle and pedestrian evacuation 
times indicate the arrival of people departing from the same census centroids, the smallest 
geographic unit for which statistical data is reported in national census.  It is important to note 
that in reality, peaks should be flatter, as it is improbable that people coming from the same 
census centroid will depart and arrive at evacuation centres or bus stops at the same time.  The 
number of buses required at each bus stop thus differs depending on number of evacuees arriving 
at any particular bus stop.  The most popular stop would be bus stop number 6 (in España Park) 
in Barracas, where potentially, 34,010 people would need 1,031 buses within 40 minutes if 
walking at average speed (1.43 m/s) (Figure 29).  This is in contrast to bus stop number 8 (at 
Luis Maria Campos) in Palermo, the stop nearest the least populated area, where up to 7,350 






Figure 29. Number of evacuees and evacuation times of pedestrians arriving at the most popular bus stop number 6 
during the day. 
 
Figure 30. Number of evacuees and evacuation times of pedestrians arriving at the least popular bus stop number 8 














































































































Bus stop number 6
Buses for pedestrians walking at avg. speed Min. speed (0.88 m/s)



























Bus stop number 8
Buses for pedestrians walking at avg. speed Min. speed (0.88 m/s)





 It was assumed the number of households in receipt of official warnings via TV, internet 
and mobile devices during the night are diminished because people are asleep.  Consequently, 
people expected at bus stop numbers 6 and 8 were reduced to 9,447 and 2,042, respectively.  The 
buses required at these stops could be further reduced, no matter what time of day, because not 
all evacuees will choose the same means of transport to evacuate.  In the future, coordination 
with the Ministry of Urban Development and Transport will be necessary to guarantee bus and 
driver availability because currently, Civil Defence only has two buses (capacity = 23 passengers 
per bus) available (Buenos Aires Defensa Civil, 2016).   
 
 Post evacuation dynamics.  In the models presented here, flood depths increase in each 
flood scenario (from 1990 to 2030, reaching their highest levels in the year 2070).  Flood depths 
also increased with lengthening recurrence period (2, 5 and 10 years), which means more people 
in BA required evacuation in the latter scenarios, since evacuation probability increased with 
flood depth.  Consequently, temporary accommodation costs rose as well.  A high variability in 
costs is probable, as evacuees may opt to stay temporarily at the provided centres, may decide to 
stay with friends or family, or even in paid accommodation of diverse types.  
 Naturally, the longer the evacuees remained away from home, the higher the cost of 
temporary accommodation.  Projected expenses arising during the first week in the worst-case 
scenario (the year 2070–10-year return flood) ranged from USD 1.03 million–USD 1.74 million, 
depending on the accommodation category (Figure 31).  However, costs calculated for the eighth 
week would decrease by 20% from costs incurred during the first week, because the models 
assumed only 10% of original evacuees would still be unable to return to their homes by then.  





returned to their homes or would have found more permanent alternative places to live, such as 
rental apartments or houses.  
 
 
Figure 31. Temporary accommodation costs in the 2070–10-years return flood scenario, BA. 
 
 Emergency response dynamics.   
 Emergency response service areas.  Fire station service areas were analysed for 
scenarios with and without flooding.  Furthermore, travel distances were scaled up in flooded 
areas by different multiplication factors (2, 5 and 10) to simulate how inundation could affect 
service areas and emergency response.  Fire station service areas in a scenario without floods 



































































categories (0–2 and 2–5 km), while no households were located more than 8 km from fire 
stations (Figure 32).  In all flood scenarios, emergency response effectiveness reduced gradually 
as the travel distance and multiplication factors increased.  This result can be observed in Figure 
32b–d.  As service areas >8 km from facilities grew, and therefore overlapped with flood-prone 
areas, access became progressively more limited.  Results show that Villa Soldati, Barracas, 
Retiro and Villa Lugano will be the most affected neighbourhoods, as 99%, 47%, 65% and 19% 
































Figure 32.  Fire stations and Staging point service areas in non-flood and the 2070 flood scenario with different 
travel distance-scaled cost factors applied.  





Fire stations and staging points, sites where fire brigades and Civil Defence are located in case of 
meteorological warnings to offer a faster response, were also modelled together. In this case, 
populations located within 2 km of stations or stating points increased by 27%, while residences 
further than 2 km diminished by 39 % (Figure 32b).  Even in flood scenarios where travel 
distance was scaled up, and with the addition of staging points, emergency response was 
improved in comparison to the response offered by fire stations independent of staging points 
(Figure 32c, 32e and 32g).  The responses of fire brigades with the addition of staging points in 
flood scenarios where travel distance was scaled up by factors of 5 and 10 were quite similar 
(Figure 32g and 32h).  Percentage population within 2, 5 and 8 km from facilities was, on 
average, 53%, 35% and 7%, respectively.  The scaled cost of traversing flooded areas requires 
further investigation, however, because increases in travel distance can be site-specific.  Factors 
such as land use, housing density and road traffic obstacles such as railroad crossings can also 
influence local traffic flows.  
 
Discussion 
 Spatiotemporal exposure.  The analyses demonstrate clearly that populations are 
increasingly exposed with increasing flood return interval and increasing sea-level rise scenarios. 
It should be noted that these estimates do not account for demographic changes, nevertheless, 
they serve to highlight spatial population exposure with attendant vulnerabilities.  Exposed 
vulnerable groups, such as unsupervised children, dependent adults, the elderly, people with 
disabilities, electricity-dependent patients, people in slums, tourists with no local knowledge and 
people confined to healthcare and educational facilities need special attention from emergency 





vulnerability assessments and evacuation plans, and may help authorities allocate resources (e.g. 
portable generators or staff) accordingly.    
 It is concluded that if BA emergency response authorities could advise support or non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) about floods, these organisations could help to spread 
recommendations and advice.  They could also encourage individuals or families to create their 
own emergency plans.  Such organisations could help authorities to make decisions about adults 
responsible for unaccompanied minors, electricity-dependent patients, elderly and disabled 
people.  In fact, BA has the highest percentage (16%) of elderly people (over 65 years) in the 
country (INDEC, 2012), which directly relates to vulnerability, as the elderly often have mobility 
limitations and therefore must rely on others for help during evacuations (Koks et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, age implies previous experience with floods, which might affect the elderly 
population’s decision to evacuate, or their preferred routes.  The highest numbers of elderly 
living in flood hazard areas are located in the north and central east parts of the city, in the 
districts of Nuñez, Belgrano, Palermo and Recoleta. 
 Tourists are also a vulnerable group because they might not speak the local language, 
know the evacuation routes or how to find help.  Identifying tourist hot spots, such as areas with 
a high concentration of tourist attractions in Puerto Madero, Recoleta, Palermo and the San 
Telmo neighbourhoods, and training local tourism industry staff, could complement other 
emergency planning efforts.  Providing information about hazards has proved to be useful to 
tourist operators during past emergency events, rather than negatively impacting the industry 
(New Zealand Civil Defence, 2008).  
 People living in slums, concentrated in the south, are also vulnerable.  Access to these 





sometimes reluctant to allow governmental agencies to enter their neighbourhoods.  Therefore, 
Civil Defence-trained leaders are needed in slums to empower the community during the 
evacuation of these informal settlements (C.A. Alvarez, Undersecretariat of Emergencies, 
personal communication, January 10, 2017).  Areas close to train lines or train stations are also 
difficult to access, because vehicles have to avoid them and find the closest level crossing.  
 Developing site-specific evacuation plans guarantees the availability of transport for 
slums, healthcare and educational facilities requiring extra assistance (New Zealand Civil 
Defence, 2008).  Site- and context-specific plans also enable large groups to be evacuated with 
less difficulty.  Alerting special needs groups and vulnerable populations about flood evacuations 
as soon as possible can shorten evacuation times and reduce stress to evacuees.  It is clear that 
Civil Defence partnerships with support groups, transport authorities, health officials, tourist 
operators and educational agencies are fundamental for an effective emergency response in BA.  
The BA Emergency Management Plan, set up in 2009, provides the legal framework for 
coordinating activities within agencies, but practical coordination and interconnectedness 
requires strengthening. 
 Future exposure of population in flood-prone areas might increase in future flood 
scenarios if population growth is considered. However, based on local statistics BA total 
population starts to decrease after the year 2031, probably due to aging population (Buenos Aires 
Ciudad, 2016).  
 
 Evacuation analysis.  Evacuations can occur during working or non-working hours.  
Therefore, Civil Defence needs to inform the BA population about the location of evacuation 





community trainings and signage.  Use of multiple media would facilitate awareness and would 
encourage people to plan their own evacuation routes, either from their residences or workplaces.  
People should also be advised to evacuate with a group who live or work nearby, and to consider 
alternative routes and meeting places if their preferred route is unpassable for any reason (New 
Zealand Civil Defence, n.d.).  
 Results suggest that facilities and logistics issues should be addressed in the evacuation 
planning phase.  Practical aspects such as signage, staff rosters, on-site security, transport 
options, free phone lines between evacuation centres to help reunite family members, shuttle 
services to key facilities (e.g., banks and governmental agencies) and alternative waste 
management are better organised before flooding occurs.  Access to healthcare, either existing 
facilities, or specially set up mobile clinics or health posts, is especially critical, and is therefore 
best organised pre flood.  
 Approximations presented here of households requiring evacuation seem to overestimate 
the number of evacuees when compared to actual numbers of evacuees, as reported in 
newspapers ("Storm in Buenos Aires," 2012; "Almost 50 deaths", 2013; "The April storm," 
2013).  Unfortunately, no official statistics quantifying evacuees from past BA flood events exist.  
On the other hand, unofficial reports might be inaccurate because no official system tracking 
evacuees exists in Argentina either, and areas flooded in the past have been smaller than those 
predicted in the scenarios evaluated in this research.  Therefore, post-event surveys are an 
essential tool for Civil Defence authorities.  Such surveys would enable them to learn more about 
how evacuation may actually work in local BA areas.  
 Estimates of potential evacuees generated in this research may be further reduced by the 





their homes.  The number of evacuees can also vary due to perceived risks.  Prior surveys 
developed by BA Civil Defence have revealed that in some areas of the city, people 
underestimated flood risk and did not consider themselves vulnerable to floods, despite 
devastating flood events they had already experienced, and despite often medium to high 
educational levels (E. Ferreti, Civil Defence, personal communication, December 26, 2016).  
Another survey showed that two-thirds of respondents did not feel exposed to flood hazards; 
respondents also felt that if a flood event did take place, its damage would be very slight, and 
that existing infrastructure would help to reduce the risk (Barachetti, 2016).  As many as 90% of 
respondents put their faith in existing infrastructure (Barachetti, 2016). 
 The perception of individuals that flooding in BA is low risk is directly related with a 
recognised unrealistic optimism bias, that means people consider themselves as less vulnerable 
and more skilful than others (Burger & Palmer, 1992).  Thus, perceived risk is lowered, and 
mitigation measures, or even evacuation options, might be discounted.  A Swedish study also 
found a weak relationship between background factors, such as educational level, and risk 
perception (Sjoberg, 2000).  
 Media can also influence people’s perceptions of risk and consequent behaviours.  For 
instance, in BA, media reports can make people focus on other hazards that jeopardise life, such 
as crime, car accidents or economic instability, and because flooding does not feature daily in 
media reports, people may neglect flood risk.  The way information is presented, especially risk 
and probability issues, can have a significant influence on how people interpret risk and assess 
their vulnerability.  People often assume low probability risks to be similar to zero (Stone, Yates, 
& Parker, 1994), or they may unilaterally reduce probabilities of a large or small number to a 





 Community debates or forums about risk, organised by official agencies, are a powerful 
tool to make people confront their perceptions about their own vulnerability and the preventive 
measures they need to put into place (Barachetti, 2016; Paton, Smith, Daly, & Johnston, 2008).  
In this way, the community is also able to participate during the decision-making process and 
with the guidance of scientists and authorities.  For example, they should be able to get involved 
in the determination of river height indicators that can trigger actions such as dissemination of 
evacuation warnings, or evacuation itself.  Community engagement also allows agencies to get to 
know people’s perceptions and how they might interpret future risk management measures or 
evacuation warnings (Paton et al., 2008).  Moreover, governmental agencies can build trust with 
the community during these meetings.  Then, people will be more likely to believe in them and 
the information they deliver, and may even use it for self-preparedness, instead of transferring 
the risk to others in society.  
 
 Vehicle evacuation.  Congestion in BA during evacuations can be reduced with a well-
planned traffic management system.  Such a system might use traffic control staff, traffic lights 
and/or contraflow, the altering of the normal flow of traffic in the opposing direction.  Good 
traffic management may facilitate evacuation by stages (e.g., by neighbourhood).  Keeping 
people informed about weather and road network conditions is also paramount, as such 
information can reduce road injuries and fatalities.  For instance, the Christchurch City Council 
provides maps showing roads that are closed, restricted by high tide, or where caution is advised, 
to residents, so people can plan their evacuation routes (Christchurch City Council, n.d.).  This 
initiative highlights the importance of updating weather and road network databases frequently, 





 The models generated in this study showed that BA evacuation centres can reach their 
capacity quite quickly, within around 12 minutes of evacuation time by vehicle.  Once capacity 
is reached, in reality evacuees must be redirected to the Pomar and Costa Rica centres, outside 
the flood-prone areas, even if this implies travelling longer distances.  The Parque M. Belgrano 
and Parque Patricios centres, both in the flood-prone areas, can potentially host evacuees if they 
are not inundated.  Even if evacuees are redirected to other existing evacuation centres, total 
existing capacity is not enough, because it only represents 0.11% of BA’s total population and 
3% of total number of evacuees for the modelled scenario.  Especially during the summer, when 
there is a large influx of visitors, including international tourists, existing centres would be 
stretched beyond capacity.  
 Pedestrian evacuation.  Results from this study showed that emergency managers should 
use information about evacuation times to focus their resources on the evacuation of areas with 
the longest evacuation times, or increase the number of buses, as Civil Defence only has two 
buses (capacity = 23 passengers).  The capacity of bus stops has not been addressed, but it is a 
critical factor authorities could use to their advantage to avoid overcrowding at evacuation 
centres, especially in the mornings, when 90% of flood-exposed households are expected to 
receive an evacuation warning.  These results indicated that more bus stops are needed in BA to 
reduce congestion.  In saying this, available resources should be reviewed with the local city 
council first. 
 Traffic logistics for both pedestrian and vehicle evacuation should be considered by BA 
authorities.  For instance, the allocation of parking spaces and the design of informative and 
understandable signals to direct evacuees before and after their arrival at evacuation centres or 





provide help and directions to larger groups.  Furthermore, registering evacuees by gathering 
contact details, information about health conditions and ultimate destination is a highly valuable 
practice.  Keeping such records may help authorities reunite family members and may also 
improve emergency management, especially in the return phase or in future events.  Self-
evacuees should be encouraged to register via toll-free 0800 phone lines, as per the New Zealand 
Red Cross system (New Zealand Civil Defence, 2008). 
 In addition to evacuation planning, the return of evacuees to their homes should be 
planned for.  Planning the return phase in BA should include several aspects, such as hazard 
level and probability of flood reoccurrence in formerly evacuated areas, buildings infrastructure 
safety and habitability, level of infrastructure and utility serviceability, hygiene, security of the 
general area and road networks, and intactness of transport facilities.  People who previously 
evacuated by private vehicle should be encouraged to return home in stages, while transport 
facilities should be arranged for pedestrians.  
 Recovery centres, currently non-existent in BA, should be located separately from 
evacuation centres to reduce logistics issues if possible.  Evacuation centres operate for a period 
of time as people gradually find other temporary accommodation or return home, whereas 
recovery centres may operate long-term, even when evacuees have returned to their homes, by 
promoting the emotional, social and physical well-being of people, or by helping them to access 
resources for rehabilitation and restoration.   
 
 Post evacuation dynamics.  The percentage of households who evacuate to centres, and 
the time they remain in them, is useful information for the management of such centres and 





important for the estimation of damage costs incurred either by the evacuees, or by the 
authorities, and for the calculation of insurance or governmental reimbursement of these 
expenses.  
 Additional costs caused by flooded properties and evacuation can include food, travelling 
and loss of earnings, among others.  For instance, people may incur additional expenses such as 
cleaning products, clothing, bedding, furniture and medical supplies.  Food can be also more 
expensive because evacuees might not have the necessary facilities to cook, and therefore, they 
will need to buy already prepared meals.  Travelling can become more costly, since commuting 
from temporary or alternative accommodation to the flooded residence, work or school can 
imply longer distances.  Affected households might also need to take time off work to clean, dry 
and repair their properties, which can be measured as a loss of earnings.  To avoid unnecessary 
accommodation costs, an assessment of residential building damage should be conducted as soon 
as practicable to determine habitability.  A conservative assessment should be avoided if the 
displacement of people is the result, but at the same time, occupants should not be exposed to 
risks from unsafe buildings.  The property assessment can be structured in two phases, as done 
by British Columbia Housing (BC Housing, 2017) in Canada, and New Zealand’s Building 
Performance branch of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE, 2014).  
First, a rapid damage assessment (10–30 min per building) is performed to identify structural and 
non-structural hazards that can make the building, or part of it, unsafe.  Once the safety of the 
building’s occupants is guaranteed, a detailed assessment (1–4 h per building) is performed to 
ascertain necessary repairs and resources (BC Housing, 2017; MBIE, 2014).  Properties in BA 





residential buildings (Appendix C), and all non-residential buildings.  All buildings can be 
classified with the following (water-proof) placards on visible entranceways: 
 “Can be used” or “inspected”.  There are no unsafe conditions or structural damage, but 
minor repairs may be needed.  The owner or occupant can take the placard down.  
 “Restricted use” or “restricted access”.  There is a hazardous condition that restricts the 
entry or use of the structure.  For instance, people might be prohibited from entering or 
using specific areas of the building, or might be allowed brief entry to retrieve their 
belongings.  Alternatively, they may be directed not to use flooded or damaged services, 
devices, appliances or fixtures until re-inspection.  Placards can be removed by a licensed 
contractor or the building authority.   
 “Unsafe” or “entry prohibited”.  The property is unsafe for occupancy or entry.  Placards 
can be only removed by the building authority.  If buildings are classified as unsafe, then 
evacuation should be ordered.  Implications of such an evaluation should be explained to 
occupants to make the process more transparent and to promote people’s cooperation 
during evacuation.  The security of the buildings and their contents should be ensured 
while occupants are away.  
 
 Emergency response dynamics.   
 Emergency response service areas.  The analysis of service areas highlighted the 
importance of reviewing the approach currently used to define fire station service areas in BA.  
In this analysis, travel distance was considered as an alternative to using city authority 
boundaries to demarcate service areas.  The relocation of existing staging points outside the 





emergency response, especially in floods.  Although political relationships were unable to be 
addressed in this research, we also believe the creation of bonds between emergency response 
authorities and the community is critical, especially in slums where self-evacuation is likely.  
 
 Proposed alternative emergency response service areas.  To meet the ultimate goal of 
this research, which is to improve flood emergency response in BA, an alternative emergency 
response scenario for the city was developed by analysing fire station service areas and existing 
staging points, which are sites where eight fire brigades and six Civil Defence are located.  These 
facilities are in place in case of meteorological warnings, and enable authorities to offer a faster 
response.  In this analysis relocating some staging points to sites outside flood-prone areas and to 
higher ground was explored.  Even though there are several staging points in the Saavedra 
neighbourhood to the north, it was decided to not remove them.  Instead, it is assumed the city 
council located them strategically because of the high vulnerability and recurrent inundation of 
the relatively new DOT Baires shopping mall, which has already motivated neighbours to make 
several requests for emergency assistance to the government (“Neighbours of Mitre,”2012) 
 To model an improved flood emergency response in BA, six additional staging points 
were located in areas where no staging points currently exist (Figure 32b and Table 15). The aim 
was to reduce travel distance for flood evacuees and emergency response personnel.  It was 
decided not to contemplate new fire stations, because they are expensive and time-consuming 
projects that include building, buying or renovating infrastructure.  Staging points imply little 
new infrastructure, but they do involve additional equipment and human resources.  Therefore, 






Table 15  
Analysis of emergency response facility service areas, BA 
Facilities included in the model 
Non-flood 
scenario 
Flood scenario and travel distance-
multiplication factors 
16 fire stations Yes 2, 5, 10 
16 fire stations + 20 staging points (8 fire brigades, 6 
civil defence evacuation centres, 6 additional) 
Yes 2, 5, 10 
Note. Staging points are sites where fire brigades and Civil Defence locate when a warning is issued to offer a faster 
response.  
 A better emergency response was shown when fire station service areas were analysed 
together with staging points (existing and additional) (Figure 32b, 32d, 32f and 32h), because 
more residences fell within a 2 km radius of facilities.  The addition of a hypothetical staging 
point in Villa Devoto, a neighbourhood in the western city centre that tends to waterlog, greatly 
improved emergency response coverage.  No staging points currently exist in this vulnerable 
area, and the closest fire station is approximately 3.2 km away.  In Villa Devoto, no one lives 
within a 2 km distance of fire stations (Figure 32a), and after a staging point was added to the 
analysis, it was found that 42,905 Villa Devoto locals would be able to receive a quick response.  
Nueva Pompeya, located in the river flood-prone area in the south, also benefited from the 
addition of a staging point (Figure 32b). The local population that then fell within a 2 km radius 
from facilities increased by 384%, a substantial improvement.  
 
 A proposal for additional evacuation centres and safe areas.  In order to further 
improve BA’s emergency response capacity and the welfare of flood-exposed populations, a 100 





inaccuracies and guarantee the evacuees safety.  The buffer tool in ArcGIS to classify existing 
evacuation centres and to identify potential sites for additional centres (Figure 33) based on the 
safety of the location.  The use of the buffer tool assured the greatest resemblance between the 
shape of the safety boundary and that of the actual flood-prone areas (Alabdouli, 2015).   
 Alabdouli (2015) used the ArcGIS buffer tool to create a tsunami shadow evacuation 
zone.  Unlike in tsunami evacuations, however, terrain elevation is not the main factor 
guaranteeing safety during flood events, because, occasionally, areas higher than 15 m may 
become waterlogged due to poor drainage capacity and shallow gradients common to BA 
landscapes.  This complexity motivated us to consider all factors: elevation, areas prone to 
flooding by the La Plata River and high-intensity rainfall events.   
 In this project, existing evacuation centres were classified first by their location (inside or 
outside the flood-prone area, and travel distance), and secondly, by their capacity to host 
evacuees (Table 16).  Given that existing evacuation have a total capacity of 3,159 people 
(0.11% of BA’s total population, and 3% of total number of evacuees for the 2070 flood 
scenario), and that some of them are located in areas affected by floods (such as Parque M. 
Belgrano and Parque Patricios), places to build additional evacuation centres and to establish 
new safe areas were identified.  Having additional safe areas and evacuation centres in more 
suitable locations in BA would reduce evacuation times and avoid overcrowding at existing 
centres.  The new safe areas and evacuation centres we propose are situated in easy-access 
locations outside hazard areas, but are still close enough to flood-prone neighbourhoods to 
facilitate evacuation.  In addition, the placement of the new sites we propose allows for 





at nearby relatives and friends’ places located in contiguous, flood-safe neighbourhoods 
(Australian Red Cross, 2013). 
 Community sports centres and sports clubs were also identified as potential evacuation 
centres, which were preferred over community sports centres, because the latter ones are 
generally smaller, and might not be able to accommodate big groups of evacuees.  Schools were 
not considered as an alternative in this study, because class disruptions would be detrimental to 
students.  Use of schools is also non-compliant with the BA Emergency Management Plan, 
which prioritises sports clubs (GCABA, 2009).  
 Sports clubs can be used as evacuation centres, either for day or overnight stays, 
depending on their facilities.  An average area of 1 m2 per person should be used to calculate 
centres’ sleeping capacities, as recommended by FEMA (2008), and a larger area is needed for 
people with service dogs, such as seeing-eye dogs.  Special consideration should be given to 
sports clubs that are privately owned, as owners might not be willing to offer their facilities.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that sports clubs located in the north (e.g., Club Atletico 
Platense, Club Racing de Villa del Parque and the Asociación Atletica Argentinos Juniors) might 
end up isolated if flooded areas extend in severe flood events, which might hinder further 
evacuation or delivery of supplies.    
 In this research, it was also recognised parks as safe areas in a bid to improve emergency 
response options for BA.  Parks were chosen as safe areas because they are large, uncluttered 
areas where emergency management agencies can set up temporary facilities, such as chemical 
toilets, information kiosks, medical clinics, food and sanitation distribution points, and animal 





facilities should be established to reduce distress to animals and their owners, similar the U.S. 
Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act (2006). 
 
 
Figure 33.  Safety boundary (100 m), evacuation centres and parks proposed for use as safe zones in the event of a 
year 2070–10-year return flood in BA. 
Note. A 100 m safety boundary around flood-prone areas was set to consider the flood model inaccuracies and 





Table 16  
Classification of existing evacuation centres based on location and capacity 
 
Evacuation centre  Capacity Rank Observation 
Chacabuco 819 1 Preferred 
Avellaneda 444 2 Preferred 
Colegiales 255 3 Preferred 
Martin Fierro 240 4 Preferred 
Dorrego 179 5 Preferred 
Pereyra 91 6 Preferred 
Costa Rica 380 7 Preferred 
Pomar 211 8 Preferred 
M. Belgrano (KDT) 378 9 Potential alternative, if not flooded 
Patricios 162 10 Potential alternative, if not flooded 
Total 3,159   
Note. M. Belgrano (KDT) stands for Manuel Belgrano (Kilometre, Distance, Time). Evacuation centres were ranked 
first by their location (inside or outside the flood-prone area, and travel distance), and secondly, by their capacity to 
host evacuees.  
  
Some of the difficulties that BA emergency managers face, in addition to the low 
capacity at evacuation centres, include a lack of staff and/or economic resources, and lack of 





Ferreti, personal communication, December 26, 2016).  The current inadequate investment in 
basic infrastructure lifelines and critical utilities does not help in reducing service disruptions 
during floods, either.  Other aspects that still need improvement are early warning systems, 
weather forecasting and radar interference.  Radar and hydrometeorological monitoring stations 
are currently being acquired to reduce these issues.  Capacity, finances and technology transfer 
were also identified as limiting factors in the Sendai Progress Report (Sendai Framework Data 
Readiness Review–Argentina, 2017) (UNISDR, 2017).  The lack of georeferenced data and tools 
to assess risk exposure have also been formally recognised (Barachetti, 2016).  Getting access to 
resources from other agencies or cities may also be a practical alternative authorities could 
consider when addressing deficiencies. 
 Other strategies that might help to improve emergency response are mobile applications, 
which have proved to be highly useful for both emergency managers and flood-affected 
populations (Houston et al., 2015).  For instance, emergency managers can benefit from mobile 
phone apps that can be used to distribute information widely, or to trigger local alerts and 
warnings, gather volunteers pre- or post-occurrence and to collect information about disaster 
effects.  Populations can take ownership of mobile apps as well, by adding risk maps or 
evacuation routes, reporting a hazard nearby, learning about preparedness or by receiving 
recovery information post event.  People can also use apps to engage in crowdfunding, 
crowdsourced hazard monitoring, sending “I am safe” messages to relatives and friends and 
monitoring more than one location according to the user’s location, or the location of family and 
friends (Tan et al., 2016).  Fluent, transparent communications between emergency managers 
and affected communities prior to a hazardous event helps to decrease information demand 





(New Zealand Civil Defence, 2008).  Overall, a well-planned evacuation strategy will allow a 
more organised evacuation in BA, and an efficient use and distribution of resources.  Planning 
and modelling will also help all stakeholders to avoid last-minute decisions, like those taken 
during hurricane Harvey in Houston, Texas, where furniture stores were converted into shelters 
(Wrights, 2017).  
 
Research Limitations and Potential Improvements 
 The limitations of the Chapter 3 analysis, and potential improvements, are summarised in 






Table 17  
Research Limitations and Improvements 
Assumptions and limitations 
Implications for model 
Potential improvements 
(-) (+) (+/-) 
Delimitation of exposed population 
Flood model is low resolution (73 × 
73 m cells) and is set at broad flood 
depth increments (1 m) 
      
Use of a high-resolution DEM and more detailed georeferenced census data (e.g., age, 
disabilities, educational level, income level, number of vehicles per household), whenever 
data become available, to better estimate the exposed population and determine their 
demographic characteristics  
Evacuation probability was 
developed for U.K. conditions.  It 
considers evacuations based on 
flood depth 
      
Development of a survey to describe people's behaviour during a flood event will help to 
identify the possible number of evacuees, the best evacuation routes, destinations, mean 
of transport and to understand the relationship between demographic variables and 
evacuation decisions.  This information should be also be recorded for future flood events 
to check if people’s responses are different from surveys results  
 
Consider infrastructure lifeline disruption and behavioural factors that might influence 
evacuation.  Engage with experts who operate lifelines and also professionals who have a 
good understanding of the Argentinean culture 
Evacuation costs were only 
measured in terms of 
accommodation costs 








Lack of infrastructural data 
regarding proposed evacuation 
centres and resources available to 
establish new staging points and 
safe areas. 
      
Evaluate together with emergency managers the feasibility of using proposed sites and 
classified them in terms of available facilities, repairments needed, viability or current 
necessity.  
Evacuees included in the same 
census meshblock depart at the 
same time from the same origin 
(census centroid) instead of 
independent locations.  
      
Use of tax-lot level land use data. Congestion might ease throughout time since evacuees 
will not depart at the same time in reality.  
Similar characteristics were 
assigned to all evacuees like 
walking speed, mean of transport, 
and initial delay time per evacuee.  
      
A detailed census dataset with information about subgroups, (e.g. children, elderly, 
disabled people, etc.) and number of vehicles per household would be could be used to 
estimate the ratio of people with similar walking speed or evacuating by car. 
Bus demand might be reduced as not all the evacuees will choose the same mean of 
transport to evacuate. Bus drivers’ compliance is assumed to be 100% during evacuation 







The following factors were not 
considered: 
 fatigue or walking speed 
variations throughout time 
 influence of travelling with 
belongings 
 evacuation path re-evaluation 
once the evacuation has started 
 congestion caused by evacuees 
departing at the same time, 
which may be more significant 
than normal rush hour  
      
Use of agent-based modelling approaches that consider individual differences in physical 
fitness and impacts of carrying possessions can be used to refine analysis.  Existing 
CASPER evacuation modelling in ArcGIS would be useful to account for evacuation 
path re-evaluation and road capacity saturation.  
Emergency response service areas     
Non-updated or detailed road 
network. Travel time-scaled factors 
of elements (flooded area, fallen 
tree, accidents, a downed electrical 
line, road work) interfering with 
traffic were assumed 
      
Use of an updated and detailed road network dataset (describing road speed limits, 
classes and widths, hierarchy, number of lanes, etc.) could be used to establish fire 
brigade service areas.  Travel time- and distance-scaled factors should be recorded in 
future flood events to evaluate how they influence emergency response and evacuation.  
Updates of the evacuation model with live data (e.g., flood depth, congestion, elements 
interfering with traffic) should be performed after each flood event. 






 Although evacuation requirements are directly proportional to flood depth, even 
shallow flood waters (0–1 m) can have a significant influence on population displacement 
and evacuation costs.  Therefore, shallow floods should not be underestimated, and because 
utilities can be disrupted in BA even in shallow floods, potential evacuation in the case of a 
0–1 m flood should be considered by authorities.  
 Evacuation models generated for this thesis showed that bus stops could become 
overcrowded and that evacuation centres may reach their capacity in a short period of time.  
These results highlight the need for coordination between emergency response agencies, such 
as Civil Defence and the Ministry of Transport, to increase the number of bus stops and the 
capacity of evacuation centres.  Existing centres can only accommodate 0.11% of BA’s total 
population (3% of the total number of potential evacuees in the 2070 scenario).  Moreover, 
evacuation of vulnerable groups and neighbourhoods with the longest routes of travel to 
evacuation centres, especially during weekdays and peak traffic hours (7–8 a.m. and 6–7 
p.m.) requires special attention.  There is also a need to calibrate and validate the BA 
evacuation model with historic scenarios, and to adjust flood model parameters to suit local 
conditions. 
 Despite recent improvements in BA’s urban and emergency planning frameworks and 
institutional arrangements, which have been introduced in the last two decades, the 
emergency response capacity of BA remains limited due to deficient or lacking resources, 
tools and staff.  Therefore, institutions should promote self-efficacy, that is, authorities should 
aim to empower the population by increasing their perceived capacity to respond to hazards 
(Paton et al., 2008; Rakow et al., 2015).  In other words, the key to improving emergency 
response is to develop city communities’ intrinsic resilience.  This can be achieved by 





to stockpile vital consumables, and assisting citizens to design private or household-level 
flood response plans compatible with evacuation routes, among other strategies.  This would 
relieve some burden on the government during the response phase, but would also translate 
into people being able to recover from disasters at a faster rate.  
 In addition to building intrinsic resilience, other ways to improve emergency response 
capacity include establishing fire station service areas based on travel distance, by relocating 
stations themselves, or by adding staging points.  A review of existing staging points is also 
necessary, as there many located in the north of BA, and they only service areas that tend to 
waterlog in high-intensity rainfall.  Areas that flood from river overflows have no staging 
points.  The staging points, safe areas, evacuation centres and routes proposed herein are 
meant to strengthen the emergency response.  However, these proposals should be examined 
in partnership with the local city council to evaluate their usefulness and in light of available 
combined resources.  
 In future research, evacuation thresholds, emergency facilities, potential evacuees, 
evacuation times and increases in travel times required for traversing flooded areas could be 
further investigated to improve emergency response.  A better understanding of the BA 
population’s behavioural patterns is also required to account for the different ethnic groups 
that live in the city (indigenous, Latin American, Asian, European).  Developing a survey to 
evaluate people's behaviours during a flood event will help in identifying the possible number 
of evacuees and in designing evacuation routes people will actually know and use.  The 
survey could also be used to to understand the relationship between demographic variables 








Conclusions and Recommendations 
 This thesis contributes to a better understanding of flood impacts and the influence of 
future projected sea level rises on the city of BA.  Herein, quantified flood damage to 
buildings and infrastructure lifelines have been quantified under current conditions.  Flood 
impacts were also projected resulting from sea-level rises predicted to occur over the 21st 
Century (Chapter 2).  The assessment of flood impacts allows a clearer understanding of how 
emergency responses can be hindered, and where evacuation might be needed, due either to 
flooding or to infrastructure disruption.  To identify the factors that increased flood spatial 
vulnerability in BA the most, the influences of land price, housing density and urban plans on 
flood impacts were investigated. 
 To determine if the city’s current emergency plan undermines emergency response 
capacity, fire station service areas and service populations were further evaluated (Chapter 3).  
The location of the populations exposed to floods and their demographic characteristics were 
also considered in the analysis.  The aim was to characterise them, and later on, to propose 
evacuation routes, staging points, additional evacuation centres and flood mitigation 
measures based on social characteristics.  
 Below is presented a summary of the conclusions drawn and recommendations made 
in each chapter.  Both conclusions and recommendations will not only contribute to the work 
that the national and BA city governments are doing to improve flood management, but will 
also inform the National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) (Cancillería Argentina 
[Argentinian Chancellery], 2007) and the BA Action Plan in the Face of Climate Change 
2020 (GCABA, 2015a).  These documents are currently being formulated with contributions 





insights about flood management and mitigation in BA, which are summarised in the 
following sections.  
 
Conclusions 
 Flood impacts.  First, exposed lifelines and utilities were located and mapped for the 
purposes of informing future flood mitigation and emergency response in BA.  These maps 
can now be used to inform emergency managers about potential alternative evacuation routes 
or resources they may need in certain flood scenarios.  Importantly, this research illustrated 
that infrastructure lifeline disruption can have indirect effects in areas outside BA.  Therefore, 
the overall area that risk managers need to focus their mitigation efforts on should be 
enlarged.  
 Results from this research also showed that the highest flood damage costs are always 
sustained by the commercial sector.  Residential and commercial building damage was 
evenly distributed throughout flood-prone areas, and was not concentrated in a single 
neighbourhood.  This result is in direct contrast to the lack of spread in industrial damage, 
because industrial areas are concentrated in the south of BA.  Of note is the fact that high-
density housing (i.e., slums) and high-value residential areas (i.e., Puerto Madero) are likely 
to suffer the highest residential sector losses.   
 This study illustrates clearly that substantial building damage can be caused by 
relatively minor floods in BA (e.g., 2- and 5-year events), and a considerable increase in 
financial losses can occur as the severity of flooding increases (e.g., in a 10-year event).  It 
also shows that losses are exacerbated by future projected sea level rises.  Fortunately, recent 
updates to BA’s legal framework and institutional arrangements have improved local flood 
mitigation, which may reduce losses.  However, more enforcement of regulations and 





for individuals taking flood mitigation measures into their own hands are required to extend 
the impact of existing regulations.  
 
 Emergency response.  Even shallow flood waters can have a significant influence on 
population displacement, evacuation costs and service disruptions.  Bus stops can become 
overcrowded quickly, and models showed that existing evacuation centres will reach their 
capacity in a short period time.  Better coordination with transport agencies and sports centres 
in BA, which are used as evacuation centres, is required to guarantee bus driver compliance 
during evacuation and to increase emergency response capacity.  
 Estimations of evacuees, and time required to reach bus stops and evacuation centres, 
have been made in this study.  Potential evacuation routes and neighbourhoods requiring 
longer times to evacuate were also identified.  This information can now be used to assist 
emergency managers in BA to prioritise neighbourhoods for evacuation and to allocate 
resources in a meaningful, efficient way.  Specifically, better management of bus drivers, 
meals, beds and waste disposal can be realised by using the new information contained in this 
report.   
 The socio-economic characterisation of flood-exposed populations in BA allows 
authorities to identify and locate vulnerable groups requiring assistance or more time for 
evacuation.  In BA, the high percentage of elderly people, concentrated in the northern and 
central east regions of BA, are one such group.  The need for specific evacuation plans was 
also identified for the many areas where limited road access will hamper rescue efforts, such 
as in slums to the south of BA.   
 Furthermore, there is great potential for improving emergency response by re-
establishing or establishing new fire stations and staging point service areas based on travel 





approach, provided here for the BA authorities are specific options for new safe areas.  These 
proposals should go a long way towards overcoming barriers such as lack of data, resources, 
data sharing and coordination, which undermine efficiency. In addition, the newly introduced 
legislation should support the recommendations and proposals contained herein.  
 
Recommendations 
 Flood impacts. Flood mitigation needs to be tailored to social characteristics (Kooks 
et al., 2015).  For instance, elderly people, concentrated in the northeast of BA, may require 
more time to evacuate; hence, improving flood control infrastructure in the northeast may be 
a more suitable option for these areas than expecting the elderly individual to put their own 
mitigation measures into place.  In contrast, subsidies to improve residential housing by 
installing water-resistant materials, or insurance vouchers, can be useful for aiding low-
income residents in the south of BA.  
 In view of the uncertainties regarding climate change, and the threshold that insurance 
companies use to determine when they will not insure properties, it is necessary to enhance 
community resilience in BA.  Focusing only on flood recurrence, or the rate of sea level rise, 
will not work for BA (Stephens, 2015).  For example, by promoting systems redundancy, 
responsiveness, flexibility, safe failure, capacity to learn, better building practices and 
learning from disasters, authorities can teach people to face climate change-related hazards 
(e.g. sea level rise) (Revi et al., 2014).  Implementing such a dynamic adaptive policy 
pathway (Haasnoot et al., 2013) will allow BA authorities to put effective, comprehensive 
flood mitigation measures into practice (as detailed in Chapter 2). 
 Attention should also be paid to the sustainability of current land use practices in the 
BA region (Saunders, 2010).  Restrictions on land development, or swapping to low-damage 





include playgrounds, recreational areas and carparks. In addition, guaranteeing maximum 
possible functionality of lifelines and utilities during and after an emergency, as they are 
critical for sustaining livelihoods, is also necessary (Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Act 2002, S60).  Options for BA may also include decentralising key assets, if viable, to 
reduce disruption and recovery time.   
 
 Emergency response.  Recommendations include organising community debates or 
forums about risk to make people recognise and address their own vulnerabilities and to help 
them identify preventive measures that may work for them.  Developing such an intrinsic 
community resilience would relieve the current high burden on government disaster recovery 
resources.  Aims for educating the BA population should include activities that increase flood 
awareness, such as staging mock evacuation scenarios.  Educational activities should also 
include information about how to stockpile vital consumables and how to design personalised 
evacuation plans. 
 Improving and systematising data collection and public accessibility to forecasts, risk 
warnings and GIS data, perhaps via mobile phone apps and social media, would probably 
yield good results for BA.  Data need to be formatted in different ways to meet end users’ 
needs, which include the protection of communities, properties and lives; the management of 
businesses affected by flooding; or the organisation of alternative supply chain routes.  The 
means of communication from response agencies to the public should to be selected based on 
target audiences.  Young people respond well to mobile phone apps and social media, for 
example.  Liability should also be considered when disseminating information, as misleading 
information can affect property market values and safety during evacuations.   
 An early post-flood assessment of utilities, key infrastructure, roads, buildings and 





would go a long way to avoiding unnecessary accommodation costs.  Traffic management 
strategies should also be considered by authorities as a tool to direct evacuees to and from 
evacuation centres, especially during rush hour, when there is more traffic congestion.  A 
practical alternative to overcoming any deficiency in resources caused by acute demand 
during a flood emergency might include gaining access to resources from other agencies or 
cities.  This solution might also be useful for other developing cities exposed to floods, sea-
level rises, population growth and rapid land subdivision.  
 
 Model refinements and future research.  The first recommendation is to increase 
flood model resolution by updating the 1990 baseline flood scenario to current scenario.  
Integrating variables should also provide improved precision to flood models.  For example, 
surface flooding, conditions preceding and following a flood event (e.g., saturated soils due 
to previous precipitation), and future changes in flood risk (e.g., changes in the drainage 
system, or evolving coastal–estuarine morphology), could be incorporated to make BA flood 
models more accurate.  Other hazards, in addition to the La Plata River, such as surface 
flooding, flood velocity, the impact of debris, groundwater rises, coastal winds, and indirect 
or cascading effects, can also be included in advanced simulations.  
 The development of a flood damage database specific to BA is recommended to 
calibrate depth–damage curves, which would facilitate estimations of building damage.  More 
detailed data, including a BA building inventory at the tax-lot level, and a comprehensive 
survey of infrastructure lifelines and utilities, which are currently insufficient or missing, can 
also help to refine flood damage assessments.  Creating strategic partnerships with service 
companies to update lifelines and utilities in a georeferenced database, and collecting 
information about system vulnerabilities and performance during floods, would allow an 





impacts, effects of utility interdependencies and business disruption should be addressed in 
future research. 
 Recording evacuation decisions (e.g., route, ultimate destination and means of 
transport) is also recommended for future flood events.  The next National Census (2020) 
could be used for this purpose, so as to avoid the separate development of flood-specific 
surveys, which implies extra resources.  Such a census-based survey could investigate BA 
population behavioural patterns, congestion hotspots, time taken to traverse flooded areas and 
crowd flow-rates.  A survey could also encompass agent-based modelling approaches, which 
consider individual differences in physical fitness and impacts of carrying possessions, to 
improve evacuation models.  In addition, flood models should be reviewed regularly with 
local emergency managers, and potentially, updated with live data as flood events unfold.  
Live data updates could include weather forecasts, traffic congestion elements, and 
information about obstacles interfering with traffic.  
 Improving the characterisation of BA’s flood-exposed population with the use of 
other sources of information rather than Census data, which are collected every 10 years, will 
be necessary in the dynamic landscape that is BA.  For example, using mobile apps, online or 
phone surveys on a more regular basis, can inform BA authorities about the people they seek 
to protect from floods.  A better socio-economic characterisation of the population, together 
with a clear understanding of behavioural patterns during flood events, will ensure 
understanding of the relationships between demographic variables and evacuation decisions.  
Such improvements will also validate flood and evacuation models to the point where 
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Appendix A: Flood Mitigation 
 Strategies that have already been implemented in different countries and can be useful 
in BA to reduce (coastal, fluvial, pluvial, groundwater) flood risk, improve emergency 
response and resilience are presented in Table 18. However, site-specific flood risks and 
management approach analysis are necessary to determine the suitability of these measures in 
the BA context (Jeroen et al., 2014). The implementation of mitigation measures can be done 
progressively, starting with sensitive areas and critical infrastructure and utilities. Issues like 
ownership of land, financial means, responsibilities for operation and maintenance need to be 
addressed together with the project design.  
 
Table 18  
Strategies for Flood Mitigation and a Better Emergency Response in BA (Deltares, Bosch Slabbers, Sweco, 
Witteeveen+Bos, & KNMI, n.d.). 
Adaptation 
solution 





More robust materials such as 
concrete, steel and glass can be 
used to make the interior of 
buildings or infrastructures 
waterproof. Also, basements 
can be elevated, and power-
supply boxes can be moved 
upstairs. 
 
In addition, the exterior of 
buildings can be made 
waterproof, and gaps and holes 
Reduction of damages, 
repair costs and 
recovery time.  













should be sealed below design 
water level. This is possible if 
design water levels do not 






Amphibious buildings are 
located on land, and only float 
during a flood period. Like 
floating buildings, they are 
fixed to posts in a horizontal 
direction to avoid drift of the 
building. (e.g. in the 
Netherlands) 
The increase of usable 
surface and reduce the 
loss of land for 
development.  
The lifting of the 
float can be difficult 
after some years of 
stationary position 
on the ground floor 
during a rapid rise 
in water levels. 
Infrastructure 
connections need to 
flexible to be able 






Raised curbs and hollowed 
roads allow increasing the 
storage and transport capacity 
of a road instead of water 
flowing into buildings directly. 
Access to buildings is 
protected and damage 
reduced.  
Handicapped access 









Temporary perimeter flood 
barriers consist of complete 
removable components, which 
are installed following a flood 
warning and dismounted after 
the end of a flood period. (e.g. 
in Scotland, and Germany) 
It takes less space and 
it does not affect 
accessibility like 
permanent flood 
protection.    
A storage location 
and training is 
needed to build a 









They avoid backflow in flood 
conditions for example in toilets 
and sewer systems.  
Prevents flood water 
entering the building. 
Damage reduction.  








The infiltration and transport-
sewer (IT) sewer is a permeable 
pipeline that allows water to 
infiltrate into the soil. When 
soils are fully saturated and 
water can no longer infiltrate, 
the IT sewer works as a storm 
water drain and excess water is 
transported along the pipe and 
discharged into another water 
body.  
The IT sewer is able to 
reduce flooding and 
improve water 
availability during dry 
periods. 
It is easier to 














Trees, shrubs, and porous 
pavements facilitate the 
infiltration of water, reduce its 
velocity and reduce runoff. 
Multilevel parking, and high 
rise instead of low-level 
buildings can contribute to 
decreasing paved impermeable 
surface areas. 
Planted surfaces 
reduce runoff and also 
cool the environment 
through 
evapotranspiration and 
by providing shade, 
reducing the heat 
island effect, 
improving air quality, 
water quality and the 
livability of a city.  
Porous pavements trap 
suspended solids and 
filter pollutants in the 
soil, thus improving 
water quality.  
 
It is necessary to 
promote permeable 



















Water can be stored during 
rainy seasons on roofs, in a 
water tank alongside the house 
or underneath buildings, water 
squares or in small lakes within 
the city and groundwater 
recharge zones. The stored 
water can later be used during 
dry seasons reducing the 
demand on the system.   
It reduces runoff and 
water shortages in dry 
periods. The stored 
water can be used for 
non-potable purposes 




training might be 
necessary to 
encourage people to 
install water tanks 
and to install them 
appropriately.  
If the stored water 







An underwater bag is fastened 
to a structure to prevent 
floatation.  
During heavy rainfall, the 
airbag is emptied to reduce 
water level rise. Later, when 
storage space is no longer 
needed the airbag can be re-
inflated.  
The airbags maintain a 
static water level 
during rainfall and 
provide increased 





training might be 
necessary to 
encourage people to 




The square can be used as a 
recreational space on dry days 
or as a water storage space 
during rainfall events. 
Rainwater collected from the 
surrounding area will flow into 
the square and slowly 
discharged to the water system. 
They not only provide 
water storage capacity 
but also aesthetic and 








Water basins are retention 
ponds constructed to store water 







Relocation of public utilities, 
buildings that store dangerous 
goods and vital infrastructure  
to higher ground is an 
alternative to minimise flood 
risk and guarantee their 
functionality during flood 
events. When relocation is not 
feasible, permanent or 
dismountable elevated quays, 
gates or flood walls can be a 
more practical alternative.  
Flood risk reduction. 
Facilities´ 
functionality is 











Budget or space 
availability can be a 




Rainwater is collected and 
infiltrated in deep wells to 
recharge deep aquifers.  
No need to use the 




necessary to avoid 
the rise of the water 
table which is 
already shallow in 
some areas of BA 






A building in a floodplain can 
be constructed on an elevated 
area while the surrounding area 
is allowed to be flooded.  
Damage reduction.  Flood risk is only 
reduced locally so 
access to the 
building might be 
limited. More 







Water portal  Surface/groundwater issues, 
their causes, monitoring results 
and projects are communicated 
through the “Water portal” in a 
non-technical way for the 
general public. It can be 
financed from sewage tax (e.g. 
Hoogeveen-The Netherlands). 
It can help to create 
buy-in from the 




for stakeholders allows 
them to implement 
suitable flood 
mitigation measures 
on their properties.  
The information 












Site clearing and limitation of 
the hazard area to a non-urban 
function to allow the area to 
become flooded. Building 
consents are no longer issued 
and services are not maintained. 
(e.g. Christchurch-New 
Zealand, Odense-Denmark)  
Damage reduction. Significant costs for 
loss of property. 
High impact on 
communities. 
Relocation might be 
difficult in a 
densely populated 
urban environment.  
Emergency response 
Evacuation 
routes at an 
elevated level  
Evacuation routes at an elevated 
level can provide a safe route in 
flood events to reach safe areas. 
They should be constructed 
above the highest predicted 
flood level (e.g. Germany). 




and safe areas. The 
capacity of the 
elevated route can 











Emergency exits should be 
constructed at the highest flood 
level to avoid the blockage of 
exits by flood water or debris. 
They can be located on rooftops 
or existing windows, which can 
be redesigned as emergency 
exits. 
Safe evacuation. More practical for 
new buildings. 
Incentives might be 
necessary for 







Appendix B: Questionnaire for Local Authorities & Civil Defence and Human Ethics 
Approval 
 
1. Which are the main natural hazards that the Local Council/Civil Defence consider 
most likely to affect Buenos Aires city? 
 
2. Is climate change and/or sea level rise being considered for flood mitigation 
measures? 
 
3. Is there a specific emergency plan for flood events? 
 
4. Which factors are contemplated for emergency planning? What are the data sources? 
(E.g. Flood models, Historic flood events/Census/ Meteorological/Hydrological 
information…)  
 
5. Are the following aspects considered in the emergency plan: Rubbish collection, 







6. Are flood models and/or Risk management software being used for emergency 
planning?  
 
7. Who are the authorities/institutions in charge of providing an emergency response? 
Are they professionals or have relevant experience in Hazards management? How is 
emergency planning funded? 
 
8. Are there any collaboration agreements between local authorities/Civil Defence, and 
NGOs/Universities/Communities? 
 
9. Based on your professional experience, do you consider that flood emergency 
response is adequate for Buenos Aires? What are the strengths and limitations of 
Buenos Aires emergency plan? Any recommendations? 
 
10. Are there specific plans for protecting/repairing electricity sub-stations? Emergency 
generators for critical facilities such as hospitals and health clinics? Potable water and 
waste water pump stations? Contamination of water supplies? Environmental 














Appendix C: Flooding Rapid Assessment From and Placards (Ministry of Business, 
1985) 
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